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  Recent world events underscore the importance of the dilemma of 
the superior orders defence and the question of how to prevent soldiers 
from undertaking abusive conduct or committing atrocities. This article 
examines the degree to which holding individual soldiers legally 
responsible for their actions can be seen to be an effective strategy for the 
prevention of atrocities and explores complementary strategies aimed at the 
prevention of abusive conduct by soldiers.  
  The article surveys historical and legal materials to illustrate the 
ongoing debate over the scope of the superior orders defence in U.S. and 
international law. The author then surveys a range of social science 
literature that suggests why some people participate in atrocities, and 
illuminates how difficult it would be for individuals to understand and 
comply with a rule expecting compliance with all superior orders except 
those that are illegal. The author concludes that the evidence undermines 
the likelihood that a norm establishing individual responsibility would 
succeed in changing conduct. 
  The author argues that it is important to restrict the application of the 
superior orders defence in order to uphold a symbolic ideal of individual 
responsibility, but that real prospects for preventing atrocities by soldiers 
depend on changing the organizational design and resources surrounding the 
soldier and specifying new obligations for those in command. The author 
recommends changes to military incentives, culture, and practices. Proposed 
strategies include the provision of meaningful and effective training programs 
for both soldiers and officers, the establishment of a military culture in which 
soldiers understand their superiors to care about violations of law and 
morality, and the integration of legal analysis into the daily operations of all 
levels of the military hierarchy so that the burden of understanding lawfulness 
does not rest solely on the shoulders of the ordinary soldier.  
  Les événements internationaux récents mettent en évidence 
l’importance le dilemme posé par la défense des «ordres supérieurs», ainsi 
que la question de comment prévenir la conduite abusive des militaires et 
dissuader ces derniers à commettre des actes d’atrocités. Cet article analyse à 
quel point le fait d’imposer une responsabilité légale aux militaires peut 
s’avérer une stratégie efficace afin d’empêcher que des actes d’atrocités ne 
soient commis. L’auteure examine également la force de stratégies 
complémentaires ayant pour but de prévenir la conduite abusive des 
militaires. 
  L’auteure se penche sur des sources historiques et juridiques pour 
démontrer la portée du débat sur la défense des ordres supérieurs au niveau 
du droit américain et du droit international. L’auteure passe en revue un 
ensemble de recherches académiques émanant du domaine des sciences 
sociales qui illustre comment des individus peuvent être amenés à commettre 
des actes d’atrocités. L’auteure explique à quel point il serait difficile de 
comprendre et de respecter une règle générale qui imposerait une conformité 
aux ordres supérieurs pour autant que ceux-ci soient légaux. L’auteure conclu 
qu’une politique axée sur l’instauration d’une norme de responsabilité 
individuelle aurait peu d’effet sur le comportement des militaries. 
  L’auteure soutient qu’il est important de restreindre la portée de la 
défense des ordres supérieurs afin de maintenir l’idéal symbolique que 
représente la responsabilité individuelle. Néanmoins, certains changements 
doivent être apportés à la structure organisationnelle qui entoure les militaires 
et aux ressources qui leur sont allouées. Les obligations incombant aux 
dirigeants militaires doivent également être redéfinies. Les réformes 
proposées par l’auteure touchent aux primes de service, à la culture et à la 
pratique militaire. Elles comprennent la mise en place de programmes de 
formation pour les militaires et les officiers, la création d’une culture militaire 
au sein de laquelle les militaires sont conscients que leurs officiers portent 
grande attention aux enfreintes à la loi et à la moralité, et l’intégration d’une 
culture d’analyse juridique pour les opérations quotidiennes à tous les 
niveaux afin que le fardeau de déterminer ce qui est conforme au droit ne 
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  In 1945, Raoul Wallenberg sent a message to SS Commander General August 
Schmidthuber to the effect that “I will see that you will be charged and hanged as a 
war criminal if you follow Adolf Eichmann’s order and direct the massacre of the 
over 60,000 Jews remaining in the Budapest Central Ghetto.”
1 His message to 
General Schmidthuber, remarkably, worked: the Jews in the Budapest Ghetto 
survived. We remember and honour Raoul Wallenberg for this and countless other 
acts of courage that directly saved thousands of lives during the Holocaust. A man 
then in his early thirties, Wallenberg used delay, persuasion, threats, bribes, and his 
invented “protective passes” to save a large remnant of Hungarian Jewry. As Irwin 
Cotler observed in his address marking the opening of an exhibit on the life and work 
of Wallenberg, his example and his memory teach us that “[n]eutrality and 
indifference by individuals or neutrality and indifference by state[s] must be 
rejected.”
2  
  Wallenberg disappeared and died, probably murdered, in Soviet custody. His 
personal sacrifice was extraordinary. It is unlikely that many of us would give our 
lives to save strangers in a strange land. Perhaps even more pressing, though, is 
discovering not what it takes to engage in such extraordinary heroism and sacrifice, 
but what it takes to resist committing abusive, illegal acts when ordered to commit 
them.  
  Consider the soldier
3 directed to shoot a civilian or the guard pushing people into 
the gas chambers; consider General Schmidthuber, ordered by Adolf Eichmann to 
massacre the more than 60,000 Jews remaining in the Budapest Central Ghetto. 
Schmidthuber could have thought, “I will be shot if I do not obey, or if I ever face 
trial, I will just say that I was following orders.” Instead, he backed down and the 
Jews were saved. What would it take for an officer to resist the order of his 
commander and halt the planned massacre? Would he simply compare the risks to 
himself and evaluate whether he would be more likely to lose his life (or his status) if 
he pursued the massacre or cancelled it? Or perhaps moral judgment would enter into 
consideration: perhaps the reminder of the wrongness of the planned massacre tipped 
the scales? What would an ordinary soldier under the general’s command think and 
do if ordered to undertake the massacre? 
 
1  See David Metzler, “Raoul Wallenberg”, online: Jewish Virtual Library <http://www. 
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/wallenberg.html>. For a historically informed fictional 
account, see Carl L. Steinhouse, Wallenberg Is Here! The True Story About How Raoul Wallenberg 
Faced Down the Nazi War Machine & the Infamous Eichmann & Saved Tens of Thousands of 
Budapest Jews (Bloomington, Ind.: 1st Books Library, 2002) at 272. 
2 Quoted in Marshall Shapiro, “Cotler decries neutrality at Wallenberg memorial exhibit” (27 
January 2004), online: B’nai Brith Canada <http://www.bnaibrith.ca/article.php?id=123>. 
3 Throughout this article, “soldier” is used to refer to any member of a military organization.  4  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  [Vol. 52 
 
 
  The Nuremberg trials, held at the International Military Tribunal established by 
the Allies after World War II, rejected the “I was just following orders” defence to 
charges of military atrocity and human rights violations.
4 A landmark in international 
law, the trials established that individuals, not only nations, are responsible for war, 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Crucial to this concept was the 
explicit rejection of the superior orders defence, as the denial of the defence confirms 
that responsibility runs to the individual even where that individual was acting 
pursuant to orders. 
  The Nazi period in Germany exposed better than any other historical experience 
how untenable it would be to embrace absolute obedience in all circumstances. The 
ostensibly civilian legal system wrested by Adolf Hitler from the Weimar Republic 
adopted a conception of the leader-state, making all law the command of the leader 
and enabling every single other person in the society to claim they were following 
orders.
5 Rejecting the defence of superior orders thus became especially urgent if 
anyone would be held responsible in a regime that officially made the orders of one 
man, Adolf Hitler, the supreme law of the land.
6 This would be true in any 
hierarchical society.
7 Orders that violate the international consensus of acceptable 
conduct even in wartime should not shield soldiers from criminal culpability.  
 
4 See note 51 and accompanying text. 
5 See Hilaire McCoubrey, The Obligation to Obey in Legal Theory (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 
1997) at 185-87.  
6 In August 1934, the Nazi Reichstag adopted a law combining the positions of president and 
chancellor and transferring all authority to Adolf Hitler (Gesetz über des Staatsoberhaupt des 
Deutschen Reichs [Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich], 1 August 1934, RGBl. I 
1934 at 747 (F.R.G.)). The Germany Army then revised its required oath of allegiance to include 
“unconditional obedience to the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the supreme 
commander of the armed forces” (Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939 (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2005) at 43, translating Gesetz über die vereidigung der Beamten und der Soldaten der 
Wehmacht [Law on the Allegiance of Civil Servants and Soldiers of the Armed Forces], 20 August 
1934, RGBl. I 1934 at 785, §2 (F.R.G.)). As one commentator explains, “The unprecedented oath was 
to Hitler personally, not the German state or constitution, as were previous Army oaths. Obedience to 
Hitler would now be regarded as a sacred duty by all men in uniform, in accordance with their 
military code of honour, thus making the German Army the personal instrument of the Führer” 
(“Hitler Becomes Führer” in The Triumph of Hitler, online: The History Place <http://www. 
historyplace.com/worldwar2/triumph/tr-fuehrer.htm>).  
7 See A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 2d ed. (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 
2004) at 190-91, 208-14 [Rogers, Law on the Battlefield]. For a discussion of whether allegiance to 
the person or the office of the U.S. presidency should command primary military loyalty, see James H. 
Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1995) at 27-29, 31 (discussing views of the General of the U.S. Army, Douglas MacArthur, 
in 1951). See also Brian Tierney, Church Law and Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages 
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1979) c. VI (discussing thirteenth-century Bishop Robert Grosseteste 
who disobeyed Pope Innocent IV in light of his duty to obey the Apostolic See, distinguishing the 
person and the institution).  2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  5 
 
 
  This legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal is widely cited, but the reality of the rule 
both at Nuremberg and since is more complicated.
8 Those complications reflect Cold 
War struggles and national self-interest. Yet even if political considerations could be 
put aside, clarifying the rule governing superior orders poses conceptual and practical 
difficulties. Conceptually, there is the basic difficulty of modifying the general rule of 
military obedience with any exception. How should the rule convey both the duty to 
obey orders and the liability for following an illegal order? Specifying the scope of 
the exception also raises complex considerations about the scope and meaning of 
international treaties, customary law, natural law, national law, and common morality. 
Even if a clear and cogent rule emerges, separate problems arise with turning it into 
an actual guide for soldier behaviour.  
  Here the problem is even more profound than the usual translation of technical 
legal rules into guides for conduct. Military training and discipline emphasize 
compliance with commands and conformity within the unit; penalties attach to 
failures to comply even with trivial directives in order to underscore military 
discipline. How can this training maintain its effectiveness if it includes not only the 
invitation but also the command to question or evaluate orders for their lawfulness? 
The conflict between obeying orders and assessing whether an order is one that 
deserves obedience is obvious and confusing to commanding officers and soldiers 
alike. In case common sense alone is insufficient to establish the point, several 
lessons from psychology underscore obstacles to a workable rule teaching both 
military obedience and resistance to illegal orders.
9  
  Moreover, the psychological and organizational contexts in which soldiers find 
themselves differ considerably from the contexts for the rest of law. The stress of war 
and the special problems posed by the war on terror accentuate these obstacles. The 
challenge, then, is not merely to devise a workable rule and effective training but also 
to address the design of the organization and culture within which responsibility must 
be distributed—and here, it is not merely the individual soldiers who must be the 
focus. 
  Thus, no honest treatment of the subject can proceed without acknowledging the 
central dilemma: telling soldiers that they face punishment unless they disobey illegal 
orders means telling them to think for themselves and question authority, yet directing 
them to do that risks undermining their training to follow orders, work as a cohesive 
whole, and subordinate their own desires and views to the collective enterprise. Taken 
to an extreme, directives to “think for yourself” and “question authority” would 
disturb the command structure and practice of drilled obedience in the military. As 
one military expert has explained:  
During military operations decisions, actions and instructions often have to be 
instantaneous and do not allow time for discussion or attention by committees. 
 
8 See Part II, below. 
9 See Part III, below. 6  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  [Vol. 52 
 
 
It is vital to the cohesion and control of a military force in dangerous and 
intolerable circumstances that commanders should be able to give orders and 
require their subordinates to carry them out.
 10  
Hence, court martial proceedings pursue acts of insubordination.
11 Disobedience in 
the context of combat can lead to immediate sanctions.
12 All of us are often in a 
position where we are expected to obey laws, directives from a boss, assignments 
from teachers or clients, dress codes, or the traffic directives of police officers. Even 
for civilians, individual thought and resistance jeopardize the order sought by official 
rules and the rule of law itself. Yet the soldier operating in modern, complex 
operations is expected more than most of us to follow training and work as a team 
member rather than as a unique individual. What, then, should be the rule about 
following orders, the rule that governs the soldiers who must both comport with 
military discipline and avoid becoming an instrument for committing atrocities during 
war? 
  Add to this basic dilemma the stress in the exigent circumstances of war and 
sheer confusion over what is right and what is wrong in the context of war. Is it 
reasonable to expect soldiers to exercise independent judgment to resist faulty orders? 
Serious violations of human rights by military actors are more likely to occur today 
not due to explicit orders from above but instead through a combination of lax 
supervision, tacit encouragement from above, and the stress from both immediate 
danger and ongoing pressures to deliver success against difficult odds. These factors 
severely complicate judgments about when solders and their superiors should be held 
responsible for mistreating prisoners and killing civilians. In addition, reliance on 
post hoc punishment based on a formal rule will always be at best a partial solution; 
not every instance of misconduct can or will be punished, and the deterrent and 
pedagogical signals from punishments are insufficient to prevent future abuses. 
Advance planning and training are crucial to preventing atrocities. But what should 
be the content of such planning and training? 
  For soldiers to develop the capacity to perceive and resist illegal directions when 
they are fundamentally expected to obey orders and military discipline, the resources 
of law, morality, psychology, and education are needed. In this work, I first describe 
recent events that underscore the importance of the topic; I then examine legal 
materials to demonstrate the continued and understandable debate over the scope of 
the superior orders defence today in U.S. and international law. I then examine social 
science findings that illuminate how difficult it would be for individuals to 
understand and comply with a rule expecting compliance with superior orders except 
those that are illegal and findings that indicate why people participate in atrocities. 
Ironically, the evidence undermines the likelihood that a norm establishing individual 
 
10 Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, supra note 7 at 208-209 [footnotes omitted]. 
11 For failing to follow orders, the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows punishment including 
the death penalty, depending on the circumstances (10 U.S.C. 47 §§890, 891, 892 (2000)).  
12 See ibid. § 815.  2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  7 
 
 
responsibility would succeed in changing conduct but underscores the potential 
importance of maintaining that norm in order to advance the ideal of individual 
responsibility. I conclude with an argument that maintaining grounds for individual 
responsibility remains important for symbolic reasons but that real prospects for 
preventing atrocities by soldiers depend on changing organizational design and 
resources surrounding the soldier, including specifying new obligations for those in 
command.
13  
I.  Why Talk About This Now? 
  Knowing when to disobey the law is a classic problem in Western philosophy and 
the subject of enduring plays and texts, from Plato’s Socrates to Denzel Washington’s 
Crimson Tide.
14 Holding soldiers responsible for failing to resist orders is a 
particularly vexing question explored in popular films such as A Few Good Men
15 and 
Breaker Morant.
16 Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led peaceful civil rights protestors in 
strategic acts of disobedience that brought international attention to the corruption 
and oppression of the Jim Crow South while triggering new rounds of debate over the 
appropriate times and places for disobeying the law.
17  
  The Enron scandal raised the issue in the context of contemporary corporate 
practices in the global economy.
18 The corporation’s Chief Financial Officer, Andrew 
Fastow, initially claimed he was following the orders of chief executives Jeffrey 
Skilling and Kenneth Lay in devising illicit profit-making schemes that ultimately led 
him to plead guilty and testify against his former bosses.
19 The Enron scandal and 
 
13 This argument has some similarity with the concept of “acoustic separation” developed by Meir 
Dan-Cohen in “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law” (1984) 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 625 at 627, 630 [Dan-Cohen, “Acoustic Separation”]. However, rather than 
distinguishing the rule of conduct (laws addressed to the general public) from the rule of decision 
(laws addressed to judges, officials, etc.), I suggest maintaining the rule of decision, but shifting 
resources to effect organizational changes in order to affect conduct. 
14 See Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, trans. by Hugh Tredennick (London: Penguin Books, 
1954); Crimson Tide, 1995, DVD (Burbank, Cal.: Walt Disney Video, 1998) (Washington plays a 
Navy officer who must decide whether to disobey the commander’s order to fire nuclear missiles or to 
follow his command and risk launching an unprovoked nuclear war). 
15 1992, DVD (Culver City, Cal.: Sony Pictures, 1997). See also The Hunchback of Notre Dame, 
1996, DVD (Burbank, Cal.: Walt Disney Video, 2002) (a soldier hero disobeys orders). 
16 1979, DVD (New York: Fox Lorber, 1997).  
17 See David Luban, Legal Modernism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997) at 209-82; 
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-63 (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1989). 
18 See Nancy B. Rapoport, “Enron, Titanic and the Perfect Storm” (2003) 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1373 
at 1393; Jaclyn Taylor, “Fluke or Failure? Assessing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after United States v. 
Scrushy”, Case Comment, (2005) 74 UMKC L. Rev. 411 at 428.  
19 See Demetri Sevastopulo, “Enron Task Force Slowly Closes in on Higher Level Targets” 
Financial Times [U.S. edition] (4 December 2002) 2; William Lyons, “Former Enron Finance Chief to 
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other colossal instances of corporate misconduct generate questions about whether 
Skilling and Lay themselves were following the implied command of shareholders to 
succeed at all costs. Thus, commentators have considered—and rejected—the 
possibility that in their corruption, deception, and destruction of a company, its 
pension fund, and the jobs of thousands, CEO Jeffrey Skilling or CFO Andrew 
Fastow were “just following orders.”
20 The issue persists in ongoing evaluations of 
corporate misconduct. Hence, the U.S. Attorney prosecuting an accountant for 
making false entries for the WorldCom Corporation explained that “just following 
orders” is no defence to breaking the law.
21  
  Military misconduct since the United States launched the war against terrorism 
after 9/11 has made the issue of following orders one of public salience. Thus, just as 
the Marine Corps filed charges of murder and conspiracy after the shooting of a 
civilian in Iraq, the media reported investigations of a separate case in which Marines 
apparently killed at least twenty-four Iraqi civilians in Haditha and then tried to cover 
it up.
22 Lawyers for a CIA contractor, charged with assaulting a detainee in 
Afghanistan who then died, argued that he was following orders.
23 Military and media 
investigations have begun to highlight potentially systematic violations of 
international and domestic law—and basic decency—in the interrogation and 
treatment of people captured in Iraq and Afghanistan and held in Guantánamo Bay, 
other facilities maintained by the U.S. government, and facilities maintained by other 
                                                                                                                                       
Face 78 Charges” The Scotsman (2 November 2002) 22; Alexei Barrionuevo, “The Courtroom 
Showdown, Played as Greek Tragedy” The New York Times (12 March 2006) 4-1. 
20 See “Faint Whistle: Enron and Ethics” (21 February 2004), online: Ethics Scoreboard <http:// 
www.ethicsscoreboard.com/list/enron.html>; Jim Wasserman, “For Students, Enron’s Fall Has Ethics 
Lessons Galore” The Sacramento Bee (26 May 2006) D1; Michael Lewis, “How Do Lay, Skilling and 
Fastow see themselves?” Taipei Times (10 March 2002), online: Taipei Times <http://www. 
taipeitimes.com/News>. See generally Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the 
Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (New York: Portfolio, 2003). In the context of 
Enron—as in the context of the military—the central problem probably stemmed less from obedience 
to bad orders than from bad conduct throughout the hierarchy flowing from an organizational culture 
that lacked moral compass. 
21 See Susan Pulliam, “A Staffer Ordered to Commit Fraud Balked, Then Caved: Pushed by 
WorldCom Bosses, Accountant Betty Vinson Helped Cook the Books” The Wall Street Journal (23 
June 2003) A1 (quoting James Comey who prosecuted Betty Vinson).  
22 Tony Perry, “Murder Charges Likely for Marines in Iraq Death” Los Angeles Times (2 June 2006) 
A1. Military investigation concluded that Marine leadership failed in multiple ways, including in pre-
deployment training. See Thomas E. Ricks,  “Haditha Probe Finds Leadership Negligent” The 
Washington Post (9 July 2006) A13. 
23 See Estes Thompson, “Civilian Abuse Trial Starts Today” The Boston Globe (7 August 2006) A4 
(describing prosecution of the first civilian brought to trial for misconduct in the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars). The court convicted the ex-CIA contractor, who was charged after beating a detainee for forty-
eight hours during questioning; the detainee died. See Estes Thompson, “Ex-CIA Contractor 
Convicted” The Boston Globe (18 August 2006) A7 (CIA Director Michael V. Hayden described the 




24 These incidents have prompted some to revisit the atrocity of the My Lai 
Massacre which itself holds an ambiguous place in American memory.
25 
  Sorting out lawful military orders from unlawful ones is difficult under the best of 
circumstances. The multiple relevant sources of law include the rules of the particular 
military service, the national constitutional law, and international humanitarian law. 
Interpreting these complex materials and applying them to shifting contexts, new 
military technologies, and disputed facts are subtle and difficult tasks. Widely quoted 
by military lawyers is the comment of a U.S. Army officer after a training exercise 
exposing some of these complexities. He said, “I know that if I ever go to war again, 
the first person I’m taking is my lawyer.”
26  
    Yet contemporary charges of abuses by the U.S. military are especially 
complicated by the administration’s departure from traditional military rules. Indeed, 
U.S. troops can fairly object that in many of their operations they do not even know 
what legal framework applies. Lawyers for President George W. Bush concluded that 
the Geneva Conventions do not protect as prisoners of war members of the al Qaeda 
network, the Taliban militia, or persons in detention suspected of these 
memberships,
27 and so argued to the U.S. Supreme Court.
28 After authorities at 
Guantánamo requested approval of stronger interrogation techniques, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that prisoners at Guantánamo Bay would not 
be viewed as prisoners of war
29 and authorized—but later withdrew—a list of 
 
24 See Rebecca Carr, “Torture Hearing to Begin in Geneva” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (5 
May 2006) A9; Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, “In Secret Unit’s ‘Black Room,’ A Grim Portrait of 
U.S. Abuse” The New York Times (19 March 2006) 1-1; “Abu Ghraib’s Ghosts: U.S. Decision to 
Withdraw from Infamous Prison Does Not Solve Human Rights Violations in Iraq” Houston 
Chronicle (14 March 2006) B8. 
25 Kendrick Oliver, The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory (Manchester, U.K.: 
Manchester University Press, 2006). 
26 Colonel Patrick Finnegan, “Operational Law: Plan and Execute” (1996) 76:2 Military Review 29 
at 32. 
27 See Memorandum re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees from 
John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice to 
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense (9 January 2002), online: The 
National Security Archive, The George Washington University <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf> at 1-2, reprinted in Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel, 
eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 
38-79 [Yoo Memorandum]; Jane Mayer, “The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White 
House’s War on Terror” The New Yorker (3 July 2006) 44. 
28 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [Rasul]; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 at 549-50 
(2004), Souter J., concurring [Hamdi]. On the moral questions raised for the lawyers giving such 
advice, see W. Bradley Wendel, “Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals” (2005) 91 
Cornell L. Rev. 67; Jeremy Waldron, “Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House” 
(2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681.  
29 See Rumsfeld Visits Camp X-Ray (CNN television broadcast, 27 January 2002), online: CNN.com 
<http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0201/27/sun.09.html>; Steven Strasser, ed., The Abu Ghraib 
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approved measures, including interrogation techniques challenged by human rights 
advocates as violations of U.S. and international law.
30 In the meantime, these 
expansive interpretations informed forces on the front lines through Department of 
Defense directives about treatment of detainees.
31 
    As a result, actions taken by members of the U.S. military violated U.S. and 
international law.
32 These include (1) detaining individuals without giving them the 
                                                                                                                                       
Investigations: The Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon on the Shocking 
Prisoner Abuse in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).  
30 See Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, “Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed: Justice 
Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible”  The Washington Post (23 June 2004)  A1; Eric 
Lichtblau, “Gonzales Says Humane-Policy Order Doesn’t Bind C.I.A.” The New York Times (19 
January 2005) A17. These developments were especially worrisome in light of research indicating the 
heightened tendency of guards to treat prisoners as less than human. See Craig Haney, Curtis Bank & 
Philip Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison” (1973) 1 International Journal of 
Criminology and Penology 69 at 69, 80. See also Erik Saar & Viveca Novak, Inside the Wire: A 
Military Intelligence Soldier’s Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantánamo (New York: Penguin Press, 
2005) at 72-73, 75, 97-99 (describing how guards in Guantánamo prison wanted detainees suspected 
as terrorists linked with 9/11, subdued them with brute strength, and wished misery upon them). 
Approved techniques included dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, and isolation. See Saar & 
Novak, ibid. at 281-92 (reprinting U.S. Department of Defense Category I, II, and III interrogation 
techniques approved by the secretary of defense on 2 December 2002); Memorandum re: Counter-
Resistance Techniques from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense to 
Secretary of Defense (27 November 2002); Memorandum re: Request for Approval of Counter-
Resistance Strategies from Lt. Col. Jerald Phifer, Director, J2, Joint Task Force 170 to Commander, 
Joint Task Force 170 (11 October 2002) [Haynes Memorandum]. Both documents can be found 
online: The National Security Archive, The George Washington University <http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf>.  
31 See Deborah N. Pearlstein, “Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, 
Detention, and Torture” (2006) 81 Ind. L.J. 1255 at 1263-1266 (citing internal military documents 
regarding treatment of detainees since 2002). 
32 Extreme examples are the instances of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, 
documented by several investigations. See U.S., Army Public Affairs, AR 15-6 Investigation of the 
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205
th Military Intelligence Brigade (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 
Public Affairs, 2004) (Investigating Officer: Maj. Gen. George R. Fay), online: U.S. Government 
Printing Office <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps53415/ar15-6.pdf> [Fay Report]; U.S., 
Department of Defense, Review of Department of Defense Interrogation Operations (2005) 
(Investigating Officer: Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III), online: Department of Defense 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf> [Church Report]; U.S., Department 
of Defense, Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report,  Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee 
Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility (2005) (Investigating Officer: Brig. Gen. John T. 
Furlow), online: Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050714report. 
pdf>. Certainty about the legality of some measures is impaired not because the administration 
sought—and failed—to create a space outside of the application of any laws, but because overlapping 
and conflicting sources of law actually applied to the civilian, military, and CIA actors involved with 
detaining prisoners at Abu Ghraib. See Diane Marie Amann, “Abu Ghraib” (2005) 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2085 at 2087, 2140. For an analysis of the international and domestic norms that apply to interrogation 
of detainees under U.S. control, see Committee on International Human Rights and Committee on 
Military Affairs and Justice, “Human Rights Standards Applicable to the United States’ Interrogation 
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opportunities to challenge their confinement as required for prisoners of war,
33 (2) 
deploying interrogation techniques that violate international standards enacted into 
U.S. law,
34 and (3) transferring detainees to secret prisons where ill treatment or 
                                                                                                                                       
of Detainees” (2004) 59 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 183. To 
remedy ambiguities, the report recommended amending U.S. law to clarify the application of 
domestic and international standards to intelligence personnel, to ensure that the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, supra note 11 applies to detainees under U.S. control, and to investigate human rights 
compliance in countries where the U.S. “render[s]” detainees (Saar & Novak, supra note 30 at 250). 
Even without any such changes, the general counsel to the U.S. Department of Defense maintained 
that the United States complies with its legal obligations in the treatment of detainees, including the 
ban against torture and the prohibition of acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (but only 
insofar as U.S. constitutional law would treat the particular acts as unconstitutional). See Letter of 
William H. Haynes III to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (25 June 2004), reprinted in Saar & Novak, ibid. at 
269-70. After Congress adopted a law to clarify U.S. commitments to disavow the use of torture on 
detainees, President George W. Bush issued a signing statement reserving authority to the Executive 
Branch for interpreting U.S. law. See Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-148, §1003, 119 Stat. 2680 at 2739 (2005), repassed to correct punctuation, National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §1403, 119 Stat. 3136 at 3475; 
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 42 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 23 (6 January 2006), online: U.S. Government Printing Office <http://www.gpo.gov>, 
incorporating by reference the Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza 
Act, 2006, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1918, 1919 (30 December 2005), online: U.S. Government 
Printing Office <http://www.gpo.gov > [Signing Statement]. 
33 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
34 For many months following 9/11, U.S. policy disputed the applicability of international standards 
to “enemy combatants” and detained terror suspects on the theory that these people were neither 
civilians of, nor prisoners of war from, a nation party to the Geneva Conventions. This view 
contradicted the interpretation prevalent among signatory states that the Geneva Conventions were 
intended to cover all individuals. Thus, international legal standards, which the United States has 
accepted, are clear about the requisite treatment of civilians during war. See e.g. Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 3, 
6 U.S.T. 3516 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Fourth Geneva Convention]. It states: 
  In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound 
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:  
  (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.  
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and 
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:  
  (a)  violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
  (b) taking of hostages;  
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torture may be underway.
35 A senior Pentagon lawyer, Albert Mora, repeatedly 
advised the Bush administration that its policy on the coercive interrogation of terror 
suspects violated the law, came close to torture, and could give rise to criminal 
prosecutions of those giving the orders.
36 Under these circumstances, what rules do 
apply? At best, such uncertainty exposes the soldiers to the risk of punishment after 
they engage in conduct that turns out to violate the laws that a tribunal applies after 
the fact. At worst, uncertainty about the legal status of enemy combatants, putative 
terrorists, or civilians who might be associating with terrorists actually invites soldiers 
to commit abuses and atrocities in a climate of fear and disorder.
37  
  Complexity about what tactics and techniques are lawful is further compounded 
by ambiguities about who is responsible for conduct that proves, post hoc, to be 
illegal. Should a soldier be liable for following an order that later turns out to be 
illegal but was not obviously illegal in his or her eyes? One military law expert argues 
that the law must protect the soldier who is risking his or her life: “In return for [his] 
unswerving obedience the solider needs the protection of the law so that he does not 
                                                                                                                                       
  (c)  outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment;  
  (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. 
35 See Human Rights Watch, “Questions and Answers: U.S. Detainees Disappeared into Secret 
Prisons: Illegal under Domestic and International Law” (9 December 2005), online: Human Rights 
Watch <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1205/us1205.pdf> (discussing application of International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 
6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR] and Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. 
T.S. 1987 No. 36 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [Convention Against Torture]). 
36 See Tim Golden, “Senior Lawyer at Pentagon Broke Ranks on Detainees” The New York Times 
(20 February 2006) A8. Mora retired in January 2006 after four years as general counsel of the Navy; 
his objection contributed to the decision to suspend the use of coercive techniques in Guantánamo 
approved in December 2002, but did not halt Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s approval of new 
techniques in April 2003. See ibid. The White House subsequently proposed retroactive protection for 
political appointees and CIA personnel involved in interrogations using techniques such as water-
boarding and other acts prohibited under Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (which bans 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” (supra note 34, 
art. 3(1)(c))). See Pete Yost, “White House Proposes Retroactive War Crimes Protection” The Boston 
Globe (10 August 2006) A8.  
37 One Pentagon investigation concluded that “leader responsibility and command responsibility, 
systemic problems and issues also contributed to the volatile environment in which the abuse 
occurred” in Abu Ghraib (Fay Report, supra note 32 at 8). See also Church Report, supra note 32 at 
16. One U.S. interrogator described both intensive training in complying with the restrictions of 
international law and, while serving in Afghanistan after 9/11, pressure to press the limits of those 
restrictions by using sleep deprivation and scare tactics. See Chris Mackey & Greg Miller, The 
Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda (New York: Little, Brown, 2004) at 30-31, 282-
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afterwards risk his neck for having obeyed an order that later turns out to be 
unlawful.”
38 This view is problematic if it revives the “just following orders” defence, 
but it exposes the problems with eliminating mitigation entirely for the soldier who 
follows an order that was not obviously illegal or about which lawyers and other 
experts disagree. Members of the military no less than any other members of the 
community deserve clarity about the law that governs their conduct. The current free 
fall from legality concerning the conduct of detentions and interrogations denies 
members of the military the clarity that would make it fair to hold individuals liable 
for breaching the rules. 
  The notorious prisoner abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison by U.S. military, CIA, 
and employees under contract with the U.S. government reflect ambiguity and 
disagreement over the rules governing permissible detentions and interrogations,
39 
although the wrongness of most of the abusive conduct is undisputed.
40 Also at work 
were inadequate training,
41 confused lines of command, competition between the 
military and intelligence teams, the boredom and anxiety experienced by young and 
inadequately trained members of the military reserve, and at least in the case of one 
person, the psycho-sexual politics of trying to impress or please a boyfriend.
42  
 
38 Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, supra note 7 at 209. 
39 See U.S., Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations, Final 
Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations (2004), 
reprinted in Strasser, supra note 29 at 14-19 (describing the migration of interrogation techniques from 
Guantánamo to military intelligence and military police soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq without 
specific guidelines, safeguards, or limits; leadership failures; inadequate resources; and tangled 
command relationships). Military justice rules do not reach civilian contractors. As the United States 
increasingly relies on civilian contractors—estimated at 20,000-30,000 contract employees in the 
current Iraq conflict—this exposes a gap in legal accountability for misconduct and abuse. See Martha 
Minow, “Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Effort Challenges Accountability, 
Professionalism, and Democracy” (2005) 46 B.C.L. Rev. 989 at 989, 994-96, 1016-20. 
40 One of the guards at Abu Ghraib told investigators, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, 
wing 1A being made to do various things that I would question morally” (quoted in U.S., Department 
of Defense, AR 15-6 Investigation of the 800
th Military Police Brigade (2004) (Investigating Officer: 
Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba) at 18, online: Department of Defense <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/ 
foi/detainees/taguba/TAGUBA_REPORT_CERTIFICATIONS.pdf> [Taguba Report]). The same 
guard explained that he neither reported nor protested the abuses “[b]ecause [he] assumed that if they 
were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something” 
(ibid. at 19).  
41 Soldiers initially deployed in Abu Ghraib were trained for military rather than prison operations. 
See Interview of Lt. Col. Patrick Gawkins by Martha Minow (22 March 2006) on file with author; 
Taguba Report, supra note 40 at 37. The military police in charge of operations at the time of severe 
abuses at Abu Ghraib had no training in handling detainees. See Interview of 1st Sgt., 372nd Military 
Police Company by Taguba panel (10 February 2004) summarized in Taguba Report, ibid., Annex 81, 
online: Department of Defense <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/taguba/ANNEX_081_ 
FIRST_SERGEANT_372ND_MP.pdf>; Church Report, supra note 32 at 19.  
42 Lynndie England was a private in the U.S. Army Reserve who became the public face of prisoner 
abuse in the Abu Ghraib prison. She flagrantly posed with naked Iraqi prisoners, holding one by a 
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  Only eight people have faced court martial and conviction related to the abuse 
scandal; the most senior official involved—the commander of the prison—received 
only a demotion in rank.
43 Pursuing those higher up in the chain of command—and 
those responsible for the absence of clear legal rules altogether—is crucial if we 
really care about accountability, the rule of law, and deterring gross misconduct in the 
war against terror. Yet following the exposure of abuses in Abu Ghraib, none of the 
investigations aimed higher than General Sanchez, toward the Pentagon; none of the 
inquiries examined the role of the CIA or civilian authorities; and apparently no 
investigations have been launched to assess directives given to U.S. forces in 
Guantánamo Bay.
44 Command responsibility—the liability of those in command for 
                                                                                                                                       
leash while dangling a cigarette from her smiling mouth, and pointing at the genitals of naked, hooded 
detainees. See e.g. Anna Cock, “Abuse Guard was ‘Just Having Fun’” The [Sydney] Daily Telegraph 
(5 August 2004) 31. England’s effort to plea bargain failed when Specialist Charles Graner testified at 
the plea bargain hearing that England had been following his orders; the judge threw out the guilty 
plea on the grounds that England was apparently contesting her guilt. At trial, the witnesses disagreed 
about whether Graner had directed her to pose with the detainees. England’s lawyer converted the 
“just following orders” claim into a psychological defence, and argued for acquittal on the grounds 
that England had an “overly compliant personality” and had fallen under Graner’s influence. The 
prosecutor countered that Private England had been an enthusiastic participant (David S. Cloud, 
“Starkly Contrasting Portraits of G.I. in Iraqi Abuse Retrial” The New York Times (22 September 2005) 
A14). Beyond these instances of humiliation at the hands of guards, personnel engaged in 
interrogation pursued such questionable techniques as scattering liquid designed to look like menstrual 
blood on inmates, forcing them to listen to extremely loud and disturbing music for long periods of 
time, keeping them in squatting positions for long periods of time, and keeping them in darkness or 
under hoods. See Saar & Novak, supra note 30 at 223-27. The legality of these kinds of techniques 
under U.S. law and under international law is an ongoing issue of debate. See notes 27-28 and 
accompanying text. On prisoner abuse in Iraq, see generally Rick Hampson, “Abuse Less Shocking in 
Light of History” USA Today (13 May 2004), online: USA Today <http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/world/iraq/2004-05-13-cover-abuses_x.htm>. See also Gary D. Solis, “Obedience to Orders: 
History and Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison” (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 988. 
43 See Suzanne Goldenberg, “End of Infamous Prison: Abu Ghraib, Symbol of America’s Shame, to 
Close Within Three Months” The [London] Guardian (10 March 2006) 3 (Brigadier Janis Karpinski 
was demoted to colonel in 2005); Bob Dart, “Abu Ghraib Aftermath: Where Does the Buck Stop?” 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (3 May 2005) A1 (discussing issues of chain of command). 
44 See Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. 
Abuse of Detainees (April 2005) at 19, online: Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
2005/us0405/us0405.pdf>. Those directives apparently included explicit instruction that the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, addressing treatment of prisoners of war and civilians, did not 
apply to the detainees under U.S. control in Guantánamo Bay despite contrary prior interpretations 
used by the military. See Saar & Novak, supra note 30 at 161-65; Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. 
Sean Watts, “Hostile Protected Persons or ‘Extra-Conventional Persons:’ How Unlawful Combatants 
in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders” 
(2005) 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 681 at 688-705, 716, 722-29. The president issued a memorandum 
“determin[ing] that common Article 3 of [the] Geneva [Conventions] does not apply to either al Qaeda 
or Taliban detainees, because ... the ... conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 
applies only to ‘armed conflict not of an international character.’” Moreover, the memo stated that 
“the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war 
under Article 4,” and that Article 4 does not apply to al Qaeda detainees or the conflict with al Qaeda 
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violations committed by their soldiers—is as important as holding individual soldiers 
responsible for following illegal orders.
45  
  There are often powerful incentives against moving up the chain of command in 
holding people accountable for military abuses. Loyalty, hopes for promotion, fears of 
retaliation, and solidarity with those in authority explain some of the reasons why 
prosecutions of higher authorities so seldom follow military atrocities, even though 
the doctrine of command responsibility obviates the difficulties in establishing orders 
or actual knowledge in advance of the violations. Yet, precisely because there is a 
chain of command, responsibility for failing to prevent or halt abusive practices can 
and must be asserted. Moreover, the prospects for establishing norms and preventing 
atrocities depend on leaders who influence military culture and practice as a whole.
46 
International criminal tribunals may be more willing than domestic courts or internal 
military tribunals to enforce command responsibility. Notably, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found a prison camp commander guilty 
under the doctrine of command responsibility for acts of murder, torture, and 
infliction of great suffering as committed by his subordinates at the camp he 
commanded for six months because he “was fully aware of the fact that the guards at 
                                                                                                                                       
(Memorandum re: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees from George Bush, 
President to The Vice President, The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney 
General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (7 February 2002) at 2, online: The 
National Security Archive, The George Washington University <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf>, reprinted in Saar & Novak, supra  note 30 at 275-76). 
Classified communications from FBI agents report abuses of prisoners at Guantánamo. Agents 
described “finding prisoners ‘chained hand and foot in a fetal position’ for up to 24 hours at a time, ... 
prisoners who had ‘urinated or defecated on themselves,’ ... a detainee [who] had been ‘gagged with 
duct tape that covered much of his head,’” and others subject to sexual and religious taunting by 
interrogators (60 Minutes: Torture, Cover-Up at Gitmo? (CBS News television broadcast 1 May 
2005), online: CBS News <http://cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/28/60minutes/main691602.shtml>). 
45 Command responsibility is the doctrine under which the commander is responsible for the 
misconduct of those under command if they acted “in pursuance of an order of the commander 
concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, 
through reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his 
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and 
reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof” (U.S., 
Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10) at para. 501 (July 1956), cited in Col. 
William G. Eckhardt, “Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard” (1982) 97 
Mil. L. Rev. 1 at 31. 
 See  also A.P.V. Rogers, “Command Responsibility Under the Law of War”, online: Lauterpacht 
Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge <http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/lectures/ 
lecture_papers.php> (“even if [the commander] does not participate directly, the fact that a breach was 
committed by a subordinate will not absolve a superior from responsibility if he knew or ought to 
have known that it was being committed and did nothing to prevent it or bring the offender to justice” 
at 17, paraphrasing Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 
art. 86, Can. T.S. 1991 No. 2 (entered into force 7 December 1978)).  
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the Celebici prison-camp were engaged in violations of international humanitarian 
law.”
47 
  But whether or not prosecutions of higher authorities proceed, it is also right to 
punish individual soldiers, like Army Reserve Private Lynndie England, who actually 
commit abuses. Even if they thought they were following orders,
48 they knew, or 
should have known, that they were engaged in conduct departing from acceptable 
standards.
49 They should be held responsible because excusing them sends a wrong 
 
47  Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, IT-96-21-T, Judgment (16 November 1998) at paras. 722, 770 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber). The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court details the terms of command responsibility in the following way:  
  28. In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:  
  (1) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or 
effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such forces, where:  
  (a) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing 
or about to commit such crimes; and  
  (b) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.  
  (2) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph 1, a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates, where:  
  (a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes;  
  (b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and  
  (c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution (17 July 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into force 1 July 2002) 
[Rome Statute]).  
48 England told CBS reporter Brian Maass, “To all of us who have been charged, we all agree that 
we don’t feel like we were doing things that we weren’t supposed to, because we were told to do 
them. We think everything was justified, because we were instructed to do this and to do that” (quoted 
in Private in Prison Abuse Photos Shares Her Story (CBS4 Denver television broadcast 11 May 
2004), online: CBS4 Denver <http://cbs4denver.com/topstories/local_story_132222538.html>). 
49 England noted that she thought the conduct that they were pursuing was “kind of weird” (ibid.). 
The whistle blower who shared the photos of the abusive conduct ultimately received praise as the 
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and dangerous message to other soldiers, the nation, and the world. This is the 
implicit message behind the refusal of the Nuremberg Tribunal to accept the superior 
orders defence, but subsequent legal developments have complicated the point. 
II.  Superior Orders: From the Nuremberg Trials to Today 
  Under an old conception, advanced by Cicero and Thomas Hobbes, the law 
should impute soldiers’ actions to the superior, not the subordinate who obeys 
authority.
50 In this view, individual solders should not be held responsible for 
following the directives of their authorized commanders. It is precisely this traditional 
view that the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal resisted. Very often cited to 
demonstrate this rejection is the decision of a court run by the United States in one of 
the proceedings following the judgments by the Nuremberg Tribunal. In the 
Einsatzgruppen Case,
51 the United States pursued elite military squads who followed 
the regular German army into the Soviet Union and Poland, rounded up civilians, and 
killed them. Applying the Nuremberg Tribunal’s rules, the court found all twenty-four 
of the defendants guilty of war crimes and wrote an opinion with this vivid 
explanation: 
  The obedience of a solider is not the obedience of an automaton. A solider 
is a reasoning agent. ... The fact that a solider may not, without incurring 
                                                                                                                                       
world community condemned the behaviour of England and others. See Praise for Iraq Whistleblower 
(CBS News television broadcast, 10 May 2004), online: CBS News <http://www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2004/05/10/iraq/main616660.shtml>. But see Wil S. Hylton, “GQ Exclusive: The 
Conscience of Joe Darby”, online: Peace Redding <http://www.peaceredding.org/The%20 
Conscience%20of%20Joe%20Darby.htm>. 
50 See e.g. Nico Keijzer, Military Obedience (Alpena an den Rijn, Neth.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
1978) at 145 (discussing Cicero), 146-47 (discussing Thomas Hobbes). See Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: 
Latin Version (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) c. 12 at ss. 1-2. British courts rejected this view in the 
seventeenth century. See McCoubrey, supra note 5 at 163-71. 
51 United States v. Otto Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen Case) (1950), 4 Trials of War Criminals 1 
[Einsatzgruppen Case]. It became known as the Einsatzgruppen Case because all of the defendants 
were charged with criminal conduct arising from their functions as members of the Einsatzgruppen, 
special task forces formed in May 1941 at the direction of Hitler and Heinrich Himmler just before the 
German attack on Russia. These units consisted of some four thousand men who followed regular 
Germany army troops into conquered territory, usually in the Soviet Union. There they would round 
up Jews, gypsies, and others, including Soviet Communist party officials. The prisoners would then be 
executed and their bodies dumped into pits. The defendants were not the decision makers but 
members of the units who engaged in these mass roundups and killings. When the trial of the 
Einsatzgruppen opened in 1947, Benjamin Ferencz told the court, “[T]he slaughter committed by 
these defendants was dictated, not by military necessity, but by that supreme perversion of thought, 
the Nazi theory of the master race” (ibid. at 30). See Dr. Stuart D. Stein, “The ‘Einsatzgruppen Case’”, 
online: Web Genocide Documentation Centre, University of the West of England <http://www.ess. 
uwe.ac.uk/genocide/einsatzgruppen_case_index_page.htm>; Michael Montgomery, Stephen Smith & 
Deborah George, “Elite Military Killing Squads” in Justice on Trial, Part 1:  The Legacy of 
Nuremberg (2002), online: American RadioWorks <http://americanradioworks.publicradio. 
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unfavorable consequences, refuse to drill, salute, exercise, reconnoiter, and 
even go into battle, does not mean that he must fulfill every demand put to him.  
 ...   
  The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders of his superior and 
if he accepts a criminal order and executes it with a malice of his own, he may 
not plead superior orders in mitigation of his offense.
52  
Here the court noted that it had the benefit of precedent in Imperial Germany to the 
same effect.
53 Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels had publicly embraced 
what he deemed to be international law on the subject when he ridiculed the plea of 
superior orders proffered by captured Allied pilots in 1944,
54 and the Nazi leaders 
during this period stated that they rejected the following orders defence.
55 
  Particular nations have over time recognized, rejected, and then recognized anew 
the superior orders defence. The United States and Great Britain, for example, have 
shifted positions, at times rejecting the defence, at times permitting it.
56 The two 
countries shifted once more in devising plans for what became the International 
Military Tribunal hearings in Nuremberg, Germany. While World War II still raged, 
Allied leaders began to talk about an international tribunal to be held after the war 
and even in early discussions urged that “following orders” should not be permitted 
as a defence.
57 Early attention to the topic showed that the tribunal idea was serious 
enough to require working out such details, but it also underscored the degree to 
which discussion of a postwar tribunal reflected hopes of deterring further atrocities 
during the war while raising the morale of the troops.
58 In 1943, leaders of seventeen 
 
52 Einsatzgruppen Case, ibid. at 411, 470-71.  
53 See Gary D. Solis, “Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Applications in American 
Forums” (1999) 15 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 481 at 495. 
54 United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
and the Development of the Laws of War (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948) at 288, 
cited in Solis, ibid. at 511. See also Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1959) at 442. 
55 See Solis, ibid. at 511. 
56 Ibid.  
57 See Howard S. Levie, “The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of 
Superior Orders” (1991) 30 The Military Law and Law of War Review 183 at 189-90. The first 
instance of a judicial response to atrocity focused on Sir Peter von Hagenbach, who was charged with 
murder and other violations in a court created by the Archduke of Austria in 1474 specifically to 
create a legal forum rather than summary execution. Von Hagenbach defended himself on the grounds 
that he was just following orders to maintain security as governor of a town in the Upper Rhine; thus, 
his case launched both the legal response to atrocity and the debate over the defence of following 
orders. See Don Murray, “Judge and Master” CBC News (18 July 2002), online: cbc.ca <http://www. 
cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/murray/20020718.html>.  
58  See Hillel Levine, “Between Social Legitimation and Moral Legitimacy in Military 
Commitment” in Thomas C. Wyatt & Reuven Gal, eds., Legitimacy and Commitment in the Military 
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nations met as part of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War 
Crimes and began to debate the rules and structures for such trials.  
  A proposal drafted by the U.S. participants in 1945 specified that defendants 
would not be allowed an absolute defence based on “act[ing] pursuant to order of a 
superior or government sanction” but would be permitted mitigation of punishment 
on the basis of superior orders or government sanction.
59 The actual Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal ultimately drawn up to govern the Nuremberg trials 
went even further, restricting the use of “superior orders” to mitigating punishment 
only in instances where justice so requires.
60 Yet despite the popular understanding 
that the Nuremberg Tribunal flatly rejected the defence, following superior orders did 
not disappear from consideration. Instead, it moved from the assessment of guilt to 
the assessment of punishment.
61  
  In trials before the tribunal, defence counsel repeatedly asserted that their clients 
were following orders, and they did not confine such assertions to the mitigation of 
punishment. Thus, lawyers for Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Colonel General 
Alfred Jodl argued that the defendants were following orders and thus not only 
should have mitigated punishment but also should have no criminal liability.
62 The 
tribunal explicitly rejected all of these claims and announced that the law of all 
nations rejected a defence based on superior orders to kill or torture in violation of 
international law.
63 Some judges at Nuremberg wanted to go further. They urged 
holding defendants responsible unless they lacked a “moral choice”—a personal 
capacity to act differently without risking one’s own life or the safety of one’s 
family.
64 This concept in contemporary terms has more in common with the defence 
 
59 American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign Ministers at San Francisco, April 
1945, art. 11 in U.S., Department of State, Report of Robert H. Jackson: United Nations 
Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1949) at 24, cited in Levie, supra note 57 at 190. 
60 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, art. 8, 59 U.S. Stat. 1544 [Charter of the IMT]. 
61 Ibid. (“The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior 
shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Tribunal determines that justice so requires”). 
62 See United States v. Karl Brandt (Medical Case) (1947), 1 Trials of War Criminals at 290-91, 325.  
63 U.K., H.C., “Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals (With the Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Member)”, Cmd 6964 in Sessional Papers, vol. 
25 (1946-47) 511 at 556.  
64 See Charles Garraway, “Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice Delivered 
or Justice Denied” (1999) 81 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 785. Article 6 of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 [Tokyo Charter] 
echoes article 8 of Charter of the IMT, supra note 60, and the Tokyo Tribunal heard and rejected 
defences based on superior orders. See Re Masuda (1945), 13 A.D.I.L. 286 at 287 (U.S. Military 
Commission). Because higher authorities were available for those prosecutions, including that of 
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Tokyo Tribunal had to focus as well on the scope of command 
responsibility, that is, the question of when a commander should be held responsible for conduct 
committed by his troops whether implicitly authorized or not. See Solis, supra note 53 at 514.  20  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  [Vol. 52 
 
 
of duress, and indeed, duress has sometimes been confused with the defence of 
superior orders.
65  
  Yet, after the Nuremberg trials, diplomatic efforts to establish a permanent 
international criminal court and to codify the rejection of the superior orders defence 
foundered as Western powers and the Soviet Union approached each negotiation in 
light of Cold War tensions.
66 Despite long meetings with expert committees, the 
United Nations could not secure agreement on proposed codifications of the laws of 
war, peace, and security; efforts to formulate principles from Nuremberg failed.
67 Nor 
could the International Red Cross summon sufficient support to include the superior 
orders provision in the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the 1977 follow-up protocol.
68 
National representatives disagreed over whether soldiers should ever be expected to 
think for themselves and decide whether or not to obey orders.
69  
   Some experts conclude that this failure by any international group to adopt a 
formal statement rejecting the defence of superior orders means that the defence is 
now available.
70 One scholar argues that because international law has not clearly 
rejected the superior orders defence, defence counsel in war crimes trials who do not 
assert a defence of superior orders would be “professionally derelict.”
71 Others 
emphasize that even the Nuremberg formulation preserved the defence in connection 
with coercion or lack of moral choice, or in limited circumstances.
72 
 
65 See Suzannah Linton & Caitlin Reiger, “The Evolving Jurisprudence and Practice of East Timor’s 
Special Panels for Serious Crimes on Admissions of Guilt, Duress and Superior Orders” (2001) 4 Y.B. 
Int’l Human. L. 167 at 169-78.  
66 See Matthew Lippman, “The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide: Fifty Years Later” (1998) 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 415 at 459. 
67 See Levie, supra note 57 at 199. 
68 See ibid. at 199-203; Garraway, supra note 64 at 785-94.  
69 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of 
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Second Session, Geneva, July 1972, vol. 1 (Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1972) at 188. 
70 In his August 2002 memorandum explaining why the Convention Against Torture, supra note 35 
would not prevent the use of coercive practices in interrogation, then–Assistant Attorney General Jay 
Bybee indicated that superior orders could be a defence in an international prosecution for violations 
of the Convention Against Torture. See Memorandum re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (1 August 2002) 
at 45, online: FindLaw <http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102mem. 
pdf>, reprinted in Greenberg & Dratel, supra note 27 at 172-217 [Bybee Memorandum]. 
71 Levie, supra note 57 at 204. 
72 See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. April, May and June 1993, UN Doc. S/25704, 117 at para. 57; 
Theodore Meron, War Crimes Comes of Age: Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 
224; Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Ninth Session, UN GAOR, 
42d Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/42/10 (1987) at 16-20. Obedience to superior orders is not a 
defence under customary international law to an international crime when the order is manifestly 
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  Most experts, in contrast, emphasize that even though efforts to codify the 
rejection of the superior orders defence failed, developing international law 
eliminates the defence in the case of orders that are manifestly illegal.
73 This leaves 
the defence available to soldiers who can show that the orders they followed were not 
clearly and obviously illegal. Chief sources for this idea of an emerging international 
legal norm on the subject are the charters authorizing international tribunals in the 
past decade. Thus, the United Nations Security Council followed the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s rejection of superior orders when it authorized the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).
74 That tribunal in a recent 
case ruled that the sheer presence of superior orders is neither a defence nor sufficient 
evidence of duress to serve as a defence.
75 In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief 
                                                                                                                                       
illegal, but “[i]f the subordinate is coerced or compelled to carry out the order, the norms for the 
defense of coercion (compulsion) should apply” as mitigation (Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against 
Humanity in International Criminal Law, 2d ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 
483).  
73 The resolution by the United Nations General Assembly at its first session in 1946 affirmed “the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and the judgment 
of the Tribunal” (Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nürnberg Tribunal, GA Res. 95(I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/95(I) (1946) 188). For an 
example of analysis using this resolution to presume continuity in international law, absent the explicit 
contrary authority in the authorization of new tribunals, see Christopher Staker, “Defence of Superior 
Orders Revisited” (2005) 79 Austl. L.J. 431 at 431-32.  
74 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991 (1993), Annex to Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), supra note 72, 134 [ICTY Statute]. The United Nations proceeded 
with very similar language when it authorized the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See 
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex to SC Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., UN 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) 15 [ICTR Statute]. For the adoption of these respective statutes, see SC Res. 
827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) 29 at para. 2 (Yugoslavia) and SC Res. 955, 
ibid. at para. 1 (Rwanda). 
75 Although these abstract statements have not yet received much application in practice, the ICTY 
has reinforced the principle that following superior orders by itself does not supply a defence to a 
charge of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. In a case that did not squarely raise the 
question, four judges of the ICTY emphasized that acting in compliance with superior orders cannot 
by itself serve as a defence; a threat to the defendant’s life or limb could supply evidence of duress, 
but the presence of orders would not satisfy the requirements of this defence. See Prosecutor v. 
Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassesse (7 October 1997) 
(ICTY, Appeals Chamber); Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (7 October 1997) at paras. 34-36 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber); 
Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen (7 
October 1997) at paras. 59-60 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber). The Trial Chamber of the ICTY has 
subsequently recognized this distinction between superior orders and duress. The tribunal concluded 
that the defendant was acting in accordance with the orders of a commanding officer but found no 
evidence of threats causing duress when the defendant participated in a massacre of around two 
hundred civilians. See Prosecutor v. Darko Mrda, IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment (31 March 2004) 
at para. 67 (ICTY, Trial Chamber I). Moreover, the tribunal emphasized that orders to participate in 
the massacre “were so manifestly unlawful” that the defendant “must have been well aware that they 
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Judge Antonio Cassesse maintained that not only does an illegal order provide no 
defence but that a soldier also has a duty to disobey an order that is manifestly 
illegal.
76  
  The United Nations authorizations for the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone each omit superior orders as a 
defence but permit the use of superior orders to mitigate punishment.
77 After some 
initial ambiguity, so have the Special Panels to hear Serious Crimes in East Timor
78 
and the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, signed by the administrator of the 
Coalition Provision Authority.
79 Yet while each uses the same approach, denying a 
defence based on superior orders but permitting mitigation if justice so requires, there 
are complications. Superior orders did supply a defence at the time the mass violence 
in East Timor was committed, so the tribunal’s elimination of the defence raises the 
danger of punishment under a retroactive law.
80 In addition, an illegal order may still 
give rise to a defence without any assessment of whether it was manifestly illegal.
81 
Given these ambiguities, one scholar recently proposed that the United States permit 
detainees in Guantánamo to assert the superior orders defence.
82  
                                                                                                                                       
violated the most elementary laws of war and the basic dictates of humanity.” Therefore, reasoned the 
court, the fact that the defendant “obeyed such orders, as opposed to acting on his own initiative, does 
not merit mitigation of punishment” (ibid.). 
76  Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassesse, ibid. at paras. 14-19.    
77 For Rwanda, see ICTR Statute, supra note 74, art. 6(1). For Sierra Leone, see Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Enclosure to UN SC, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915 (October 2000), art. 6(4) 
[mimeo.] [SCSL Statute] (“The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government 
or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the Special Court determines that justice so requires”). See also 
Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, SCSL-2004-14-AR72E, Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of 
Jurisdiction (13 March 2004) at para. 62 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber). 
78 On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses, 
TAET Reg. 2000/15, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15, s. 21 [mimeo.]. For illustration of ambiguity 
in initial drafts, see Human Rights Watch, “Unfinished Business: Justice for East Timor” (August 
2000), online: Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor-
back0829.htm> (urging limits on superior orders defences).  
79 The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, GC/Law/10 December 2003/1, Al Waqai Al-Iraqiya 
Official Gazette of Iraq 2003, vol. 44, No. 3980 at 127, art. 15(e). For delegation of authority for the 
tribunal, see Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 48, Appendix A, The Statute of the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal, CPA/Ord/10 December 2003/48, Al Waqai Al-Iraqiya Official Gazette of Iraq 2003, Vol. 44 
No. 3980 at 125. 
80 See Linton & Reiger, supra note 65 at 34. 
81 See ibid. at 44 (considering application of the defence in the East Timor situation). The authors 
also suggest that the cultural context may make obedience to orders especially compelling there (ibid. 
at 45).  
82 See James. B. Insco, “Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions” (2003) 13 Duke 
J. Comp. & Int’l L. 389 at 416-17 (proposing that detainees should be able to assert the defence in 
order to identify their intentions and whether they had acted under duress or mistake). 2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  23 
 
 
  The drafters of the treaty authorizing the International Criminal Court departed 
from the other recent statements by permitting the defence where the order, given by 
a superior to a subordinate, was not manifestly unlawful and where the soldier did not 
know the order was unlawful.
83 A soldier charged with war crimes—though not 
genocide or crimes against humanity—can defend himself or herself from criminal 
liability by satisfying three conditions: that he or she was legally obligated to follow 
the orders to commit the war crimes, that he or she did not know the orders were 
illegal, and that the orders were not on their face manifestly illegal.
84 Moreover, 
though this seems excessively literal, a soldier charged with war crimes might be able 
to assert such a defence if the order in question was not phrased expressly as an order 
“to commit genocide” or an order “to commit ... crimes against humanity.”
85 The 
appellate panel interpreting this law incorporated the moral choice test, further 




83 The Rome Statute, supra note 47 authorizing the creation of the Permanent International Criminal 
Court, makes clear that it is no defence to follow orders that are manifestly illegal, and it defines 
orders to commit genocide and crimes against humanity as manifestly illegal. Yet, it specifically 
permits the defence in other circumstances. Article 33 of the Rome Statute, entitled “Superior orders 
and prescription of law”, states: 
(1) The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, 
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility 
unless: 
  (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the 
Government or the superior in question; 
  (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
  (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
(2) For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity are manifestly unlawful (ibid.). 
Although the ICC has not yet interpreted this statute, it seems to permit the defence in circumstances 
that the other tribunals would forbid. One scholar argues that “although a defence of superior orders is 
now expressly recognised in Art 33 of the ICC Statute, that defence does not yet form part of 
customary international law. Rather, in customary international law, the Nuremberg principle still 
prevails, according to which superior orders is no defence but may be taken into account in mitigation 
of sentence” (Staker, supra note 73 at 446). Staker warns that inconsistencies between the ICC and the 
Nuremberg principle could produce different results based entirely on where a person happens to be 
tried (ibid. at 447). 
84 Rome Statute, ibid., art. 33(1).  
85 Ibid., art. 33(2). 
86 See Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment (29 November 1996) at 
paras. 14-19 (ICTY, Trial Chamber); Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Judgment (7 
October 1997) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber). See also Garraway, supra note 64; Paola Gaeta, “The 
Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary 
International Law” (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 172 at 173, 184, 187. 24  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  [Vol. 52 
 
 
  Several countries committed to the ICC have already amended their domestic law 
to match the ICC standard on superior orders.
87 If many come to do so, this could 
change the status of the defence in customary international law, for it would show a 
shift in custom. In the meantime, without having endorsed the ICC, the United States 
has indicated room for the defence under limited circumstances. Thus, the U.S. 
Manual for Courts-Martial currently permits the defence as follows: “It is a defense 
to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew 
the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have 
known the orders to be unlawful.”
88 This provision not only permits superior orders as 
a defence but does so when a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not 
realize that the order is unlawful. By pegging the standard to the person of ordinary 
sense and understanding, this version extends the defence beyond an objective test of 
illegality to a standard considering ordinary persons’ knowledge of the law. 
Moreover, the manual indicates that doubts about the legality of an order are to be 
resolved in favour of its legality.
89 
  The Canadian version permits the defence except if the order was manifestly 
unlawful to a reasonable soldier under the circumstances.
90 It adopts a definition of 
manifest illegality as that which is “obviously and flagrantly wrong.”
91 Variations 
over time, across nations, and among tribunals render doubtful the assertion that the 
 
87 See Staker, supra note 73 at 442-46 (describing efforts by Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom to bring their domestic laws in line with the ICC treatment of superior orders).  
88 U.S., Department of Defense, Manual for Courts-Martial (2005), R.C.M. 916(d), online: Air 
University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf> 
[Manual for Courts-Martial]. The manual’s “Discussion” of the rule explains, “An act performed 
pursuant to an unlawful order is excused unless the accused knew it to be unlawful or a person of 
ordinary sense and understanding would have known it to be unlawful,” and notes that “[o]rdinarily 
the lawfulness of an order is finally decided by the military judge” (ibid. at II-109).  
89 Despite procedural variations across Western nations, doubts about an order’s legality are 
generally to be resolved in favour of their legality for purposes of the defence of illegal orders. U.S. 
law historically directed soldiers to presume orders to be lawful, and therefore courts martial are to 
place on the soldier who disobeys an order that is not “patently illegal” the burden of rebutting the 
inference of lawfulness. See ibid. at para. 14(c)(2)(a)(i); Keijzer, supra note 50 at 97, 133 (comparing 
court martial rules in the U.S., U.K., France, the Netherlands, and Israel).  
90 “An act is performed in compliance with an order which is manifestly unlawful to a reasonable 
soldier given the circumstances prevailing at the time does not constitute a defence and cannot be 
pleaded in mitigation of punishment” (Canada, Department of National Defence, Law of Armed 
Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003) at 
para. 1615.2, online: Office of the Judge Advocate General <http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/training/ 
publications/law_of_armed_conflict/loac_2004_e.pdf> [JAG Manual]). This rule implies that, absent 
manifest illegality, following orders can supply a defence in Canada. 
91 Ibid., citing R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 at 834, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 513, Cory J. The JAG 
Manual  further cites Cory J. to the effect that in order for an order to be considered manifestly 
unlawful, “[i]t must be one that offends the conscience of every reasonable, right thinking person. It 
must be an order which is obviously and flagrantly wrong” (ibid.). 2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  25 
 
 
Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the superior orders defence as a matter of international 
law.  
  No single international norm governing the defence of superior orders currently 
exists. The following variations currently govern in different settings: there is no 
defence of following superior orders but superior orders provide grounds for 
mitigation;
92 superior orders do supply a defence but only if the subordinate person 
did not know it was illegal and it was not manifestly illegal;
93 superior orders do 
supply a defence but only if the subordinate had no moral choice or latitude for free 
action;
94 and superior orders supply a defence if a person of ordinary sense and 
understanding would not know that the order is illegal.
95 Taken together, these 
articulations imply that there exists a set of orders that lies between the manifestly 
illegal order and the order that could be illegal, but is not manifestly so, and that this 
intermediate order could indeed be the basis for a defence against charges of 
atrocity.
96 This nuanced idea and each of the specific efforts to articulate the norm 
complicate the message that soldiers and others receive about individual 
responsibility. Whether phrased as a defence or instead as mitigation of punishment, 
the line between acceptable and unacceptable obedience to superior orders is not 
likely to produce clarity or changes in soldiers’ conduct. Yet even these complications 
pale as a problem when compared with the psychological barriers to resisting orders 
or pressures to participate in wartime abuses.  
III.  Moral Development and Psychological Theories: Why 
Resistance to Orders is Difficult 
  Each of the versions of the rule poses serious difficulties of comprehension and 
compliance. For each of them requires individual soldiers to obey directives from 
superiors but also to disobey under a very limited set of circumstances. The soldier is 
told simultaneously, “Obey all orders” and “Do not obey a manifestly illegal one or 
one to commit a genocide.” Under some versions, the soldier is told, “You will not 
face the full brunt of punishment if you did not know the order was illegal and other 
people of ordinary intelligence and knowledge did not know that either, but you will 
still face some punishment. Thus, you should take responsibility unless you cannot; 
 
92 See Charter of the IMT, supra note 60, art. 8; SCSL Statute, supra note 77, art. 6(4). 
93 See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 33.  
94 See generally Levine, supra note 58. The impact of hierarchy on the subject’s sense of choice 
may well vary depending on setting. Thus, the soldier “may feel there is no choice but to obey, 
knowing what the orders entail. In contrast, the member of a civilian bureaucracy may not know there 
is a need to make a choice because the orders have no known link to a harmful outcome” (Herbert C. 
Kelman & V. Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and 
Responsibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) at 315 [emphasis in original]). 
95 See Manual for Courts-Martial, supra note 88, R.C.M. 916(d). 
96 The Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 33(2) clarifies that superior orders never supply a defence in 
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you should obey all orders unless you think you should not.” Under the version 
emphasizing the soldier’s moral choice, the message is: “You should resist an illegal 
order unless you cannot—however, people later will assess whether you could not.” 
  These difficulties with the legal treatment of superior orders may come to mind 
simply through common sense. But they are substantiated by research in moral 
psychology, social psychology, and cognitive psychology. Five insights from these 
fields expose the enormous and perhaps insurmountable difficulties in training 
soldiers to prevent atrocity.
97 
A.  Insights from Psychological Research 
1. Cognitive  Dissonance 
  Using superior orders as a defence or as mitigation of punishment effectively 
summons competing and indeed contradictory beliefs about authority. This is the 
classic set-up for what psychologists call cognitive dissonance. When we are in the 
presence of two conflicting messages, over time we drive one out of view because the 
dissonance itself is too difficult to bear.
98 As a result, we may try to change one or 
more of the conflicting beliefs, opinions, or behaviours to reduce the dissonance; we 
may look for new information to reconcile the conflicting views. Given the situation 
of hierarchical command, obedience to the immediate superior is the view likely to 
prevail. In any case, many people will find it hard to hold onto both the view that 
each order from a commander deserves respect and obedience and the view that the 
superior’s orders can be grossly illegal and must be disobeyed.  
2.  Heuristics and Baseline References 
  Another body of psychological research suggests that the specific formulation of 
the rule about superior orders is likely to affect how it is perceived and what 
judgments it generates. Research into heuristics and bias suggests that people 
overemphasize an “anchor” or starting point when making judgments involving a 
comparison between that starting point and something else; the anchor seems to affect 
 
97 Social scientists turned to such questions not only because of the Nuremberg trials, but also after 
the trial of Lt. Calley following the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War. See Kelman & 
Hamilton, supra note 94.  
98 See Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, “An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and 
an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory” in Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, eds., 
Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology (Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychological Association, 1999) 3. Festinger, who originated research on the topic, 
indicated that people tend to try to reduce cognitive dissonance by changing one of the beliefs 
involved in the dissonance, trying to reduce the importance of one of the beliefs, or else trying to 
acquire new information or beliefs that will make the conflicting views seem consonant. See Leon 
Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) at 25-26. 2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  27 
 
 
attention and predispose the person to certain conclusions rather than others.
99 
Similarly, research on reference points indicates that the selected reference point 
affects perceptions and the way people assign value to options.
100 Hence, the starting 
point that treats superior orders as presumptively legal is going to affect people 
differently than the version stating that superior orders are no defence except under 
limited circumstances, even if semantically the two versions have the same meaning. 
Any training of soldiers that states the superior orders rule to emphasize that there is 
no defence based on manifestly illegal orders will invite disobedience with more 
salience than a statement of the rule emphasizing that, in the ordinary case, superior 
orders are due deference. Other research—about stages of moral development and 
studies of obedience and conformity—suggests dimensions of human behaviour that 
may well swamp the cognitive response to the statement of the rules governing 
superior orders or the lawfulness of the orders. 
3.  Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development 
  Lawrence Kohlberg researched how moral reasoning shifts over the course of 
human development. Based on an assessment tool used to catalogue the methods and 
sophistication of individuals based on their responses to descriptions of hypothetical 
moral dilemmas, Kohlberg articulated six stages of moral development. These stages 
can illuminate how different people, with different degrees of sophistication in moral 
reasoning, would approach the conflict between following superior military orders 
and following conscience or moral conceptions.
101 Kohlberg’s work suggests that the 
moral reasoning of most adolescents and many adults is characterized by commitment 
to following conventions and authority. These individuals will not be likely to 
articulate a duty to resist manifestly illegal orders.  
 
99 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” 
in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 3 at 14-18; Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff 
& Sarah Lichtenstein, “Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk” in Kahneman, Slovic & 
Tversky, ibid., 463 at 481-82; Daniel Kahneman, “Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed 
Feelings” (1992) 51 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 296. 
100 See H.R. Arkes, “Cost and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Decisions” (1991) 110 
Psychological Bulletin 486. 
101 What follows draws upon William C. Crain, Theories of Development: Concepts and 
Applications (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980); Lawrence Kohlberg & Elliot Turiel, 
“Moral Development and Moral Education” in Gerald S. Lesser, ed., Psychology and 
Educational Practice (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1971); Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of 
The Child, trans. by Marjorie Gabain (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997); F. Clark Power, Ann 
Higgins & Lawrence Kohlberg, Lawrence Kohlberg’s Approach to Moral Education: Critical 
Assessments of Contemporary Psychology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Joseph 
Reimer, Diana Pritchard Paolitto, & Richard H. Hersh, Promoting Moral Growth: From Piaget to 
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  Kohlberg built on Jean Piaget’s theories of human development, from childhood 
through adulthood, and from concrete to abstract thinking. Kohlberg studied how 
individuals over the course of their lives think in moral terms. He identified six stages 
of human development in thinking about moral issues.
102 Most people, he argued, 
progress at least through the first several stages and very few reach the highest stage 
of development.  
  Kohlberg and others working with him found that young children start by 
thinking of themselves rather selfishly, and not in terms of membership in society. 
Young children thus talk about the right thing to do in terms of obedience: they think 
they should do the right thing in order to avoid punishment. When they advance a bit, 
they move to thinking in terms of their own self-interest but understanding that in 
order to get what they want, they may need to bargain or do things in exchange. At 
this stage the child does not simply equate punishment with wrongfulness but rather 
views punishment as a risk.  
  Most teenagers attain what Kohlberg called the “conventional” mode: they think 
about doing the right thing in order to develop and maintain good interpersonal 
relationships and in order to be a “good girl” or “good boy.” When asked what people 
should do in response to particular moral dilemmas, at this stage a person tends to say 
that everyone should conform to prevailing laws or norms. A more advanced version 
of this emerges for many by the end of high school. Individuals at this stage justify 
conformity in light of larger social purposes, like the need to maintain social order. 
  Many people progress and come to use more abstract thinking about the need to 
coordinate people with different interests and needs. Typically, they use more 
complex bases to justify adherence to collective rules and respect for the collective 
arrangements specified by a constitution, including the respect accorded to individual 
rights of speech and autonomy. People who reason this way may call for improving 
society generally to incorporate moral views into laws.  
 
102 The following table has been adapted from Kohlberg’s work. In addition to the sources listed in 
note 101, see e.g. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the 
Idea of Justice, vol. 1 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981) at 17-19. 
Level Stage  Social  Orientation 
Preconventional 1  obedience/punishment 
Preconventional 2  individualism,  instrumentalism,   
and exchange 
Conventional  3  good interpersonal relationships, 
good girl / good boy 
Conventional  4  maintaining social order,  
law and order 
Postconventional  5  social contract and  
individual rights 
Postconventional  6   principled conscience 
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  Finally, a limited number of people (Mahatma Ghandi and, as it turns out, 
Lawrence Kohlberg) develop beyond even this advanced stage to offer complicated 
assessments of right and wrong, based on universal principles and not whim or even 
merely national norms. Kohlberg noted how Mahatma Gandhi’s thought took this 
advanced form. 
   There is a striking convergence between Kohlberg’s language and the problem 
for the soldier who is instructed both to follow orders and to remember that it is no 
defence to genocide or war crimes to say that he or she was following orders. 
Kohlberg’s stage theory may seem to imply that we each move through the phases of 
moral development over the course of a lifetime.
103 If that were the case, younger 
people would think it right simply to follow superior orders and conform with the 
conduct of other soldiers; adults would come to think independently about what 
morality requires and about acting according to their own conscience.
104  
  Yet not every person follows the path laid out in Kohlberg’s stages, and dilemmas 
about dealing with orders arise even within stages. Thus, even the child who is 
focused on the risk of punishment faces tension between the punishment by the 
superior and the punishment by peers. When they think about moral conduct, soldiers 
who are concerned primarily with maintaining good interpersonal relationships and 
with being a “good solider” will choose conformity and look to peers as well as 
authority figures. This preoccupation with conformity may characterize the majority 
of soldiers in the volunteer military. Many young people enter the military after high 
school—or, these days, accept recruitment before they finish high school. Many lack 
the cognitive and emotional sophistication to distinguish compliance with moral 
ideals from compliance with orders or peer pressure. A military that recognizes this 
pattern among its soldiers must cultivate leaders, organizational structures, and a peer 




103 Kohlberg controversially argued that the stages he identified are both universal, in the sense of 
being cross-cultural, and invariable, in the sense that every individual moves through each stage in the 
order listed until he or she stops somewhere on the path of development. See ibid. at 20ff., c. 4. Many 
critics through the years have challenged the assumption of invariable stage development and 
progression and universality of the stages. Critics have faulted the work for cultural and gender bias 
and what some would call self-referentialism. See e.g. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1982) at 18, 21-22, 25-27, 30-31, 54-55, 82; Sohan Modgil & Colin Modgil, eds., Lawrence 
Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy (Philadelphia: Falmer Press, 1986). For responses to the critics, 
see Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine & Alexandra Hewer, Moral Stages: A Current Formulation 
and a Response to Critics (New York: Karger, 1983).  
104 Research has not established that educational programs will enhance either the complexity of the 
students’ moral reasoning or the likelihood that the student will behave differently—for example, will 
resist illegal authority. 
105 This conclusion departs from Kohlberg’s own prescriptions, which focused on cognitive 
development and involved presenting students with moral dilemmas that would challenge them to 
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4.  Milgram’s Studies of Obedience 
  The controversial and influential studies of obedience by Stanley Milgram 
precisely address the issue of following orders raised by criminal defendants at the 
Nuremberg war crimes trials.
106 Milgram set up a task in which the volunteer would 
play the role of a “teacher” who was to help a “learner” learn a list of words. The 
volunteer teachers were told to administer an electric shock, with increasing voltage, 
each time the learner made a mistake. These were not actual electric shocks, but the 
volunteers did not know that. The fictitious story told to these volunteer “teachers” 
was that the experiment was exploring effects of punishment (for incorrect responses) 
on learning behaviour. The teacher was not aware that the “learner” in the study was 
actually an actor, merely simulating discomfort as the teacher increased the electric 
shocks. An “experimenter” in the booth with the teacher would encourage the teacher 
to push the volt-delivering button when the teacher expressed reluctance. In fact, the 
experimenters would tell the teachers that they had no choice but to deliver the 
shocks.  
  The “experimenters” and the “learners” were confederates, employed by 
Milgram. The volunteer teachers initially received assurance that there would be no 
lasting physical damage, but they heard and watched manifestly painful reactions to 
the “shocks” that they delivered; nonetheless, most went ahead. In Milgram’s 
repeated runs of the experiment, sixty-five per cent of the teachers were willing to 
administer the maximum shock of 450 volts despite the cries of pain and screams for 
mercy. No volunteer stopped before reaching what was marked as 300 volts. Some of 
the volunteers asked who would be responsible for any harmful effects resulting from 
shocking the learner at such a high level. When the experimenter answered that he 
assumed full responsibility, volunteers seemed to accept the response and continue to 
                                                                                                                                       
think in more sophisticated ways. Kohlberg prescribed educational programs in light of his research. 
He developed materials for a form of moral education that would push people to experience 
limitations of their current stage by posing dilemmas that would prompt them even to rethink their 
premises and move to more complex levels of analysis. See Lawrence Kohlberg, “Stage and 
Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization” in David A. Golsin, ed., 
Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969) 347; F. Clark 
Power, Ann Higgins, & Lawrence Kohlberg, supra note 101. It remains unclear whether pedagogy 
addressing moral dilemmas promotes enduring cognitive advances in approaching moral dilemmas, 
and whether any cognitive development translates into desirable behavioural outcomes. 
106 See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1973); Thomas Blass, “The Social Psychology of Stanley Milgram” in Mark P. Zanna, ed., 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 25 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1992) 277. See 
also Stanley Milgram, Obedience, 1965, VHS (University Park, Pa.: Penn State Audio-Visual 
Services, 1969); Elaine Cassel, “Why Do People Want To Be Executioners? A Review of The Last 
Face You’ll Ever See by Ivan Solotaroff”, Book Review, online: Houghton Mifflin College Division 
<http://college.hmco.com/psychology/resources/students/shelves/shelves_20020504.html>. 2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  31 
 
 
administer the “shocks”, even though many expressed great discomfort with it and 
tried to resolve the conflict by conveying complaints to the experimenter.
107  
  These and subsequent studies raised many questions about how the subjects 
could bring themselves to administer such heavy shocks and about the ethical issues 
in conducting such research.
108 Follow-up studies found that factors associated with 
increased obedience include perceived legitimacy of the authority figure, greater 
distance from the victim, closer supervision by the authority figure, and the presence 
of people who modelled obedience.
109 Yet studies of nurses showed a strong tendency 
to follow instructions to deliver an excessive dose of medication even though the 
order came over the telephone from an unfamiliar physician.
110 
  Milgram’s work has had real influence, including on the U.S. military. His 
biographer Thomas Blass reports that Milgram’s work had been integrated into two 
psychology courses in the U.S. Military Academy in 1985, and his work continues to 
remain influential in training soldiers “how to disobey illegitimate orders.”
111 The 
head of the academy’s Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership wrote in 
1985, “One of the desired outcomes of this is that our future military leaders will be 
 
107 The preceding description of Milgram’s experiments draws from the following sources in 
addition to the sources listed in note 106: Stanley Milgram, “Behavior Study of Obedience” (1963) 67 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 371; Stanley Milgram, “Group Pressure and Action 
Against a Person” (1964) 69 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 137. See also Kelman & 
Hamilton, supra note 94 at 152-53; James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit 
Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 121-22, 209, 236, 249, 251, 
274; Arthur G. Miller, Barry E. Collins & Diana E. Brief, “Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: 
The Legacy of the Milgram Experiments” (1995) 51:3 Journal of Social Issues 1. 
108 See Stanley Milgram’s Experiment, online: College of Business Administration, University of 
Rhode Island <http://www.cba.uri.edu/Faculty/dellabitta/mr415s98/EthicEtcLinks/Milgram.htm>. 
109 See Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 94 at 162-66; Waller, supra note 107 at 105-106; Wim H.J. 
Meeus & Quinten A.W. Raaijmakers, “Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht Studies” (1995) 
51:3 Journal of Social Issues 155 at 159, 163. One scholar maintains that social psychological factors, 
such as peer behaviour and the difficulty of knowing or achieving personal goals in social 
conversation, influenced the level of compliance by subjects in these experiments. See Neil Lutsky, 
“When Is ‘Obedience’ Obedience? Conceptual and Historical Commentary” (1995) 51:3 Journal of 
Social Issues 55 at 57-62. If this is so, these factors suggest that peer influence and personal interests 
may contribute to the commission of atrocities alongside or instead of the sense of a duty to obey.  
110 See Charles K. Hofling et al., “An Experimental Study in Nurse-Physician Relationships” (1966) 
143 Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 171. On the compliance and disobedience of nurses to 
physician orders, see generally Annamarie Krackow & Thomas Blass, “When Nurses Obey or Defy 
Inappropriate Physician Orders: Attributional Differences” (1995) 10 Journal of Social Behavior and 
Personality 585.  
111 Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram (New 
York: Basic Books, 2004) at 278 [Blass, Man Who Shocked] [emphasis in original]. See also Thomas 
Blass, “The Man Who Shocked the World” Psychology Today 35:2 (March/April 2002) 68 at 73 
[Blass, 2002]. The studies formed the basis of a television drama, 60 Minutes: The Tenth Level (CBS 
television broadcast) and many articles in popular media. Milgram’s work has been translated into 
eleven languages. See Waller, supra note 107 at 102-103.  32  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  [Vol. 52 
 
 
fully cognizant not only of their authority but also of their responsibility to make 
decisions that are well considered and morally sound.”
112  
  Critics not only addressed the ethics of conducting such experiments
113 but also 
explored whether the tendency to obey reflects an inevitable deference to authority or 
instead a response to particular features of the situation.
114 One scholar recently 
concluded that despite the gap between the laboratory setting and combat situations, 
Milgram “correctly focuses our attention on the social and situational pressures that 
can lead ordinary people to commit extraordinary evil.”
115 Less enduring is Milgram’s 
claim that such behaviour stemmed from a kind of shift into the role of passive agent 
without a sense of personal responsibility; neither his own evidence nor subsequent 
work substantiates the claim that the shifting out of a sense of personal responsibility 
or the development of a separate self is necessary to commit great harm.
116 
  Milgram’s work has thus supported educational interventions on the premise that 
self-awareness for both authority figures and those who follow them can mitigate the 
risk of unswerving obedience to illegal commands. Subsequent work on obedience 
has produced greater attention to the effects of context, internalization of roles, 
dehumanization of victims, and peer conformity.
117 In a parallel inquiry, Philip 
Zimbardo and others conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971 in which 
undergraduates received random assignments, some to play the role of prison guard, 
others to play the role of prisoner.
118 In a few days, many of the “guards” became 
aggressive and abusive, and many of the “prisoners” became passive, submissive, or 
depressed.
119 Zimbardo later explained, “When people are deindividualized, they are 
 
112 Quoted in Blass, 2002, ibid. at 73. 
113 See Blass, Man Who Shocked,  supra  note 111 at 111-30; Alan C. Elms, “Obedience in 
Retrospect” (1995) 51:3 Journal of Social Issues 21 at 26-27. Milgram’s study may be more famous 
for having ushered in rigorous restrictions on the use of human subjects in experiments. Ethics 
considerations and concerns that some of the subjects in Milgram’s work may have experienced 
unhappiness and even trauma triggered a process of self-examination among university and hospital 
authorities about the methods used by experimenters, leading ultimately to greater regulation. See 
ibid. 
114 See Thomas Blass, ed., Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm 
(Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000); Moti Nissani, “A Cognitive Reinterpretation of 
Stanley Milgram’s Observations on Obedience to Authority”, Comment, (1990) 45 American 
Psychologist 1384 at 1384. 
115 Waller, supra note 107 at 108. Waller notes that Milgram’s subjects did not have certain 
knowledge that their actions would produce lasting damage; they did not experience years of 
socialization devaluing the victims; they did not show the kind of sadism sometimes exhibited by 
perpetrators of mass violence; and they did not have long periods of time in which to act or reflect on 
their actions (ibid. at 107-108). 
116 See ibid. at 111, 120-123. See also Nissani, supra note 114. 
117 See Waller, supra note 107 at 133-35, 180-82, 195-96, 202-20, 225-30, 247-49.  
118 Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison” 
(1973) 1 International Journal of Criminology and Penology 69.  
119  Ibid. See also Philip G. Zimbardo, Stanford Prison Experiment, online: Stanford Prison 
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usually put in herds, or groups, and given numbers. Their identity is taken away.”
120 
Zimbardo concluded that the abuses by guards in the Abu Ghraib prison were 
predictable because “the guards had a mob mentality, a group mindset. You start to do 
things because other people in your group are doing them.”
121 The loss of individual 
identity in the situation reflects elements of conformity as much as obedience.
122 This 
points toward another line of research. 
5.  Studies of Conformity 
  One more set of insights relevant to the issue of obeying orders deals with the 
dynamics of group conformity and social cohesion. Psychologist Solomon Asch 
showed that an individual is likely to go along with the statements of others about the 
perceived length of lines on a card; three quarters of subjects in the experiment 
conformed at least once even though that meant suppressing their knowledge of an 
obvious fact.
123 More recent efforts to replicate the study fail to do so. That has led 
psychologists to conclude that conformity is affected by culture, child-rearing, and 
other factors, and does not represent a stable feature of human interactions.
124  
  Yet studies of processes of social obedience indicate that some people comply 
with directed behaviour not because they believe it, but because it will achieve an 
effect they want. Such effects can include avoiding conflict with a closely supervising 
authority figure.
125 Conformity can similarly appeal to those who want to avoid being 
ridiculed or rejected by peers, and conformity pressures increase in groups with 
cohesive ties built by affection or mutual dependence. The military epitomizes such a 
group. 
 
120 Quoted in Nastassia Lopez, “Abuse At Iraqi Prison Predictable, Decades-Old Study Shows” 
MTV (27 May 2004), online: MTV <http://www.mtv.com/chooseorlose/headlines/news.jhtml?id= 
1487984>.  
121 Ibid. 
122 Willingness to torture also goes beyond obedience to authority often in involving the individual 
in a culture of violence, turning torture into normal behaviour. See Mika Haritos-Fatouros, “The 
Official Torturer: A Learning Model of Obedience to the Authority of Violence” in Ronald D. 
Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, eds., The Politics of Pain: Torturers and Their Masters (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1995) 129. 
123 See Solomon E. Asch, “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a 
Unanimous Majority” (1956) 70:9 Psychological Monographs 1 at 9-10. See also S.E. Asch, “Effects 
of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments” in Harold Guetzkow, ed., 
Groups, Leadership and Men (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963) 177; Solomon E. Asch, Social 
Psychology (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952) at 450-59. 
124 See Marie-France Lalancette & Lionel Standing, “Asch Fails Again” (1990) 18 Social Behavior 
and Personality 7; Steven Perrin & Christopher Spencer, “The Asch Effect—A Child of Its Time?” 
(1980) 33 Bulletin of the British Psychological Society 405. 
125 See Kelman & Hamilton, supra note 94. They distinguish this stance from identification, when 
one is oriented toward fulfilling a role that calls for the behaviour in question, and from 
internalization, when someone accepts the authority because it matches his or her own value system. 
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  The power of conformity as an influence when members of the military follow 
orders to kill civilians is exhibited in Christopher Browning’s historical study of a 
battalion of German policemen pressed into service in World War II.
126 This battalion 
was responsible for killing 38,000 Jews. Browning studied interviews conducted after 
the war with the men who mainly returned to their homes and ordinary lives. On the 
first day of the mass killing, the commander permitted members of the battalion to opt 
out of the killing. A handful did at first, and more did over the course of the day, but 
no more than twenty per cent ever did. Most indicated horror or disgust over their 
involvement in the massacre. Browning concluded that group conformity and the 
desire not to be seen as cowards by others or be ostracized by the battalion helped to 
explain their conduct. Some also conceived of their participation as sharing in an 
unpleasant collective duty.
127 The records of the men also showed that they did not for 
the most part have anti-Semitic views at the start of the operation. Many over time 
overcame an initial reluctance to participate in the mass slaughter.
128 Similar 
dynamics seem to accompany the activities of bullies in schools. Peer pressure and 
conformity affect classmates who assist, encourage, or simply remain silent in the 
face of the bully.
129 
  Peer pressure is one of the key mechanisms through which obedience to higher 
authority works. Developing a strong enough sense of self and beliefs to stand up for 
what is right often means risking disapproval from peers. How can we expect people 
to develop the clear-sightedness to know an illegal order (whether explicit or implicit) 
when they see one and to practice resisting authority—and group pressure—when we 
also expect people generally to respect and conform to authority? There is an 
unavoidable tension between conformity and independence. Conformity permits 
 
126 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in 
Poland (New York: Harper Collins, 1992). 
127 See ibid. at 161, 185. 
128 See ibid. Daniel Goldhagen wrote a more controversial piece using some of the same sources 
and arguing that the ideology of anti-Semitism, rather than social conformity, motivated these men, 
thus making the killings voluntary. See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: 
Ordinary Germany and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). See also Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen, “The Evil of Banality”, Book Review of Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 
and the Final Solution in Poland by Christopher R. Browning, The New Republic 207:3-4 (15 July 
1992) 49. In the Afterword of the 1998 reissue of his book, Browning tries to refute Goldhagen’s 
argument. See Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland, reissued 1st ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998) at 191-223. See also Waller, 
supra note 107 at 29-49 (challenging Goldhagen’s claims as illogical, unsubstantiated, and unable to 
explain other genocides and mass killings). On the importance and rarity of nonconformity in the 
context of genocide and mass killings, see Michael Geyer & John W. Boyer, eds., Resistance against 
the Third Reich, 1933-1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) (discussing rare 
nonconformists who resisted the Third Reich). 
129 See Dan Olweus, Bullying at School: What We Know and What We Can Do (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1993) at 34-35, 43-45. See also David P. Farrington, “Understanding and Preventing 
Bullying” in Michael Tonry, ed., Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 17 (Chicago: 
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order but also risks groupthink and even mass atrocity, while independence promotes 
resistance to atrocity but risks disorder and inefficiency.  
B.  Learning from Psychology: Ordinary Soldiers Are Not Well Placed 
to Prevent Atrocity  
  Taken together, these five kinds of social science research generate real doubts 
about the efficacy of relying on the judgment and conduct of ordinary soldiers to 
prevent atrocities that stem from the orders of superiors, the lax supervision of 
superiors, or permission by superiors. Cognitive dissonance arises when individuals 
are expected both to respect and question superior orders, and the dominant 
message—here, the obligation to follow orders—will most likely push out the 
countermessage. As studies of heuristics show, stating the rule about liability for 
following superior orders in terms of a prohibition with exceptions will be understood 
differently than the emerging statement of the rule as permission with limitations. 
Stage development theory underscores that most young soldiers will approach moral 
questions by thinking about approval and disapproval by peers and authority figures; 
expecting people to distinguish illegal and legal orders neglects the pervasiveness of 
this kind of conventional moral thinking and the preference for compliance and 
getting along. Holding people responsible or punishable for following orders does not 
match evidence about the psychological readiness of individuals to take and follow 
orders from people they understand as authority figures. Nor does it comport with 
evidence of how ready people are to identify with an assigned role and to conform to 
group behaviour. Thus, on the basis of varied sources of social science research, we 
can predict that soldiers will follow orders whether legal or illegal, that soldiers will 
conform to expectations of superiors and peers, and that soldiers will be unlikely to 
resist a commander or peer group authorizing or engaging in atrocities. Indeed, many 
or even most of these young soldiers will be inclined to obey authority and to 
conform—whether to the commands of the authority or, what is more chilling, to 
abusive conduct started by some of their peers.  
  But excusing people on any of these bases compounds the risks of catastrophic 
abuses committed by soldiers and communicates disregard for the values of human 
decency and individual responsibility. So what should the military and civilian 
authorities do with the defence of superior orders; what should they do to prevent 
military atrocities? I argue in the next part for separating these two questions: there 
should be a rule regarding superior orders, but the primary effort to prevent military 
atrocities must pursue other routes. 
IV. What Should We Do to Prevent Atrocities? 
  If the goal is to minimize atrocities, restricting the ability of soldiers to claim that 
they were following orders holds at best limited promise. The varied statements of the 36  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  [Vol. 52 
 
 
rule are too confusing,
130 and most of the incentives and practices for soldiers point  
toward obeying directions and orders. It is the unusual soldier who will resist. Thus, 
counting on individual soldier responsibility is an insufficient guard against abuse. 
Moreover, pushing the distinction between obviously or manifestly illegal orders and 
other kinds of orders as the basis for liability is likely to increase the already obvious 
pressure on superior officers to avoid explicit orders that direct genocide or violations 
of domestic or international law. If the result is more vagueness in orders, the risks of 
atrocity rise rather than decline. 
  There may be symbolic value but slight practical benefit arising from training 
ordinary soldiers to know and remember that they may be held responsible for acts 
even when performed under orders or superior direction. How to increase the chances 
that such training methods will be effective is worth some consideration, but a chief 
value of such training both comes from and depends upon its integration into the 
larger value system of the military organization—and hence requires action and 
follow-through in the behaviour of the superior officers. In this part, I will offer 
further reflections on the superior orders defence, the potential avenues for training, 
and the organizational implications of serious efforts to prevent military atrocity. 
A.  Limited Prevention from Restricting the Superior Orders Defence  
  It is a truism that no military atrocities can occur without the participation of the 
individuals who wield the weapons, abuse the detainees, and kill the civilians. It is 
tempting to focus attention on these individuals, to hold them responsible, and to 
make them examples for others. Indeed, individual soldiers who murder civilians or 
abuse detainees should be held responsible. But doing so is not likely to reach the 
deeper causes of military atrocity. 
  The social and psychological influences on those individuals reach far beyond 
their own consciences. Insights from social science indicate good reasons to think that 
a person placed in a subordinate position and instructed to obey presumptively 
legitimate authority will be likely to follow those orders even if they see them as 
wrong. The most effective methods for preventing abuse by the military will most 
likely involve (1) organizing military teams, management structure, rewards, and 
promotions in order to integrate legal and moral considerations into command 
decisions and to create sufficient checks against both illegal commands and lax 
supervision; and (2) assigning the specific task of evaluating the legality of orders to 
commanders close enough to the field to be able to make concrete decisions guiding 
soldier conduct.  
    Clarifying whether and when following superior orders reduces or eliminates 
liability is not likely to prevent military atrocities. Both research and common sense 
indicate the near futility of teaching soldiers the rule that superior orders do not shield 
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them from punishment or liability for genocide, mass violence, or crimes against 
humanity. However formulated, the rule produces cognitive dissonance: sometimes 
the soldier should obey without question and sometimes the soldier should question 
and not obey. Some formulations may push toward more questioning than others, but 
once in the field, this rule is not likely to be foremost in the soldier’s mind.  
  Legal scholar Mark Osiel criticizes the dominant rule that denies a defence to 
soldiers who follow superior orders if those orders are manifestly illegal. He argues 
that denying a defence to soldiers who follow a manifestly illegal order as a practical 
matter “imposes a broad duty to obey superior orders that is qualified by an equally 
bright-line duty to disobey orders to commit atrocities.”
131 Osiel notes that this 
approach obliges the soldier to comply with orders in the ambiguous middle area, 
where orders to commit abuses may be illegal, but not manifestly so. This precise 
logical analysis comports with the predictions of the social psychological research 
surveyed earlier. Given the competing directives to obey all orders but to expect 
liability for obeying manifestly illegal ones, the soldier—likely attached to 
conventional morality and influenced by peer pressure—is most likely to obey all 
orders.  
  Osiel himself prefers a different rule, one that calls for obedience only to lawful 
orders and punishes obedience to unlawful orders except if the soldier makes a 
reasonable mistake about the lawfulness of those orders.
132 He argues that when 
compared with the dominant rule, his rule would put individual soldiers on greater 
guard to assess the legality of orders in that zone of ambiguity and would hold more 
soldiers responsible for following orders whose lawfulness is ambiguous.
133 In effect, 
he maintains, his rule would generate more discussion and debate among groups of 
soldiers about what is the right thing to do. And, he claims, that in turn would lead to 
more awareness by ordinary soldiers of their legal duties.
134  
 
131 Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline & the Law of War (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Transaction, 1999) at 287. In conversation with me, Lawrence Blum has pointed out that this 
suggestion increases the burden on the individual to take initiative in finding out if an order is illegal 
and to resist unlawful ones, but even this heightened pressure accomplishes little if the actual content 
of the legal duty is ambiguous.  
132 Ibid. at 287-89. 
133 Ibid. at 290-91, 293, 295. 
134 Osiel also argues that his rule would shift onto the soldier the burden of producing evidence of 
knowledge and persuading the relevant tribunal that the soldier’s error was honest and reasonable, 
while the “manifest illegality” rule leaves the burden on the prosecution to show that the defendant 
knew or should have known that the orders were illegal. See ibid. at 292. However, Osiel has faced 
criticism on this point. See Maj. Walter M. Hudson, Book Review of Obeying Orders: Atrocity, 
Military Discipline and the Law of War by Mark Osiel, (1999) 161 Mil. L. Rev. 225 at 231-32 (citing 
Manual for Courts-Martial, supra note 88, R.C.M. 916(b) to illustrate that Osiel mischaracterized 
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  His prediction and claims for his alternative rule implicitly comport with the 
insights from heuristics about the importance of the anchoring phrase in a rule.
135 But 
Osiel’s proposal otherwise does not match the insights from cognitive dissonance, 
stage development, obedience studies, and studies of conformity as conveyed by the 
social science research. If the line between legal and illegal orders is seriously 
ambiguous, and most of the training and ethics of the military emphasize obeying 
orders, a small training unit on superior orders will not alter the overall message, even 
if the rule is recast as Osiel suggests. Inviting front-line soldiers to police the 
borderline cases misunderstands their pressures, capacities, and incentives.  
  If the problem is finding the courage to dissent and act on conscience, soldiers 
will need direct and repeated training with detailed factual situations to cultivate the 
conscience and motivation to dissent. Even then, unless the larger contexts of military 
hierarchy and values are altered considerably, such training will have limited value. 
Moreover, even avid debate among soldiers makes no difference if the nation’s law, 
despite Osiel’s view, draws the line to include as lawful those orders that some find 
violate their consciences. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Israel Defense Force 
(“IDF”) is characterized by more internal debate, less hierarchical relations, and more 
dissent than the U.S. military forces.
136 Even in the court martial process, the Israeli 
government has allowed latitude to objectors, permitting not only legal but personal 
and political arguments about service in the occupied territories. Nonetheless, the 
courts have convicted all of the objectors, and construed “manifestly illegal” orders to 
cover narrow ground.
137  
  Osiel claims that by punishing obedience to unlawful orders, his proposed rule 
would lead soldiers to engage in more debate among themselves about what is and 
what is not lawful. This implication is not so obvious. The soldiers would have to risk 
peer disapproval if they raised objections to orders; there is no assurance that debate 
would reflect knowledge about legal standards or raise the level of actual moral 
conduct. Such debate might produce more resistance to illegal orders but it might 
equally generate more mutual reinforcement to follow orders. The most likely effect 
of Osiel’s rule would be to discourage those giving the orders from doing so in 
 
135 See Part III.A.2, above. His emphasis on cultivating the soldier’s sense of honour and 
commitment to his fellow soldiers also matches prevalent understandings of soldiers’ motivations. See 
e.g. Wolfgang Royl, “Military Pedagogy and the Concept of Leadership Development and Civic 
Education” in Edwin R. Micewski & Hubert Annen, eds., Military Ethics in Professional Military 
Education—Revisited (Frankfurt am Main, F.R.G.: Peter Lang, 2005) 22 at 22, 24. 
136 I base this in part on three focus groups I held with veterans of the IDF in spring 2006. My 
informants suggested that universal service, a small, relatively homogeneous society, the presence of 
highly educated individuals in each platoon, and the irreverence and informality of Israeli culture 
contribute to an atmosphere of questioning and debate. None of my informants served in another 
military, however, and thus each had limited basis for comparison. 
137 See Hadar Aviram, “Discourse of Disobedience: Law, Political Philosophy, and Trials of 
Conscientious Objectors” (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 728743, 23 May 2005), 
online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
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specific terms. Ratcheting up the attention to potentially illegal orders is likely to 
generate fewer explicit superior orders whose legality is debatable. Commanders 
would risk liability (which could also come with low rates of enforcement) under 
command responsibility for the actions of the soldiers under command. Superiors 
would then be likely to seek the deniability afforded by ambiguous or vague orders.  
  The significance of the legal treatment of the superior orders defence lies less in 
its actual ability to deter atrocities than in terms of the expressive values of the law.
138 
Here, maintaining the message of individual responsibility, etched since the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, conveys national and international will to curb military 
atrocities but is even more directly a refusal to excuse atrocities or war itself as the 
products of abstract forces or nations. Holding individuals responsible even if they 
followed orders is a way to reaffirm that though neither killing unarmed civilians in 
their homes
139 nor prisoner abuse is genocide, both are blatantly wrong. Even if the 
national laws fall short, the individual soldier must be held responsible for failing to 
resist explicit or tacit orders that are morally wrong, including a command structure 
that produces obviously unacceptable and harmful behaviour. That apparent lesson 
from the Nuremberg trials is tested by current U.S. military conduct; this makes 
revisiting the lesson all the more urgent.
140 The expression of individual responsibility 
in this setting helps to anchor the democratic ideals of participation and 
accountability, individual autonomy, and freedom of expression. Historic resistance to 
limiting the defence of superior orders
141 is couched usually in concern for 
maintaining military discipline. Those who want to maintain restrictions on the 
superior orders defence should still seek to reinforce the individual responsibility that 
attaches to soldiers for their own misconduct, quite apart from following illegal 
orders.  
  To some degree, I am suggesting here something akin to the concept of acoustic 
separation, developed by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, in which the conduct rule aimed 
to affect the behaviour of ordinary citizens has different content than the decisional 
rule that seeks to guide decision makers like judges.
142 For example, the conduct rule 
 
138 See Robert Cooter, “Expressive Law and Economics” (1998) 27 J. Legal Stud. 585; Sara Sun 
Beale, “Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal 
Enforcement?” (2000) 80 B.U.L. Rev. 1227 at 1254-63; Lawrence Lessig, “The Regulation of Social 
Meaning” (1995) 62 U. Chicago L. Rev. 943; Bernard E. Harcourt, “After the ‘Social Meaning Turn’: 
Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy 
Analysis” (2000) 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 179.  
139 Investigations of two recent incidents of such Marine conduct in Iraq communicate that the 
United States still sets legal limits while engaged in Iraq. See “Civilian Deaths Send Top Marine to 
Iraq” (25 May 2006), online: CNN.com <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/25/hagee. 
iraq/>. 
140 See note 22 and accompanying text (Marines charged with murdering Iraqi civilians). 
141 See Part II, above. 
142 See Dan-Cohen, “Acoustic Separation”, supra note 13. Dan-Cohen’s idea is actually part of a 
larger project that emphasizes individual dignity and the socially constructed contexts of morality. See 
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“Ignorance of the law is no excuse” has the desirable effect of encouraging people to 
learn about the law, but decision makers might well operate under a different rule that 
excuses ignorance of the law in some circumstances. Rather than making a distinction 
between one rule to guide conduct and another to guide decision makers, I suggest 
that we need a rule restricting superior orders as a defence for moral and expressive 
purposes, but that serious efforts to constrain military abuses also require work at the 
levels of military organization, staffing, and incentives.
143  
  Expressive purposes should not be treated in this context as wholly apart from 
instrumental effects. The very expressive dimensions of law may stimulate collective 
investment in monitoring activities or the willingness of community members to 
report offences—with the effect of strengthening the norm at issue.  
  This is the finding of recent research on hate crimes legislation.
144 This research 
acknowledges that hate crimes legislation is often designed for symbolic reasons, 
such as changing the social meaning of certain bias-motivated criminal acts in public 
discourse. Identifying a law as symbolic tends to suggest that it does not have actual 
effects, but this study suggests that although California’s hate crimes legislation 
generated quite varied practices in different agencies and departments, those that 
adopted policies of community engagement, such as watchdog groups or a human 
rights commission, were associated with increased levels of hate crimes reporting.
145 
Symbolic legal acts can have measurable effects when connected with organizational 
features enabling those effects. Similarly, restrictions on a superior orders defence, if 
joined with activities, particularly training programs and organizational changes 
devoted to preventing atrocities, could produce results.  
B.  Small Gains Through Training Programs 
  The prescription that follows military atrocities tends to be training. That is what 
observers have demanded following the abuses of detainees in Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo.
146 Yet determining the appropriate mode and content of training is a 
complicated task, as three experiences illustrate: the civilian massacre at My Lai, the 
Israeli “Black Flag” incident, and a recent experience of U.S. troops in Iraq.  
                                                                                                                                       
Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
143 Serious enforcement of command responsibility would offer one source of incentive. See Part I, 
above. 
144 See Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, “Beyond Symbolic v. Instrumental Law: Hate Crime 
Policy and Law Enforcement Practice” (21 January 2006) [unpublished], online: Center for 
Organizational Research, University of California, Irvine <http://www.cor.web.uci.edu/documents/ 
jennesspaper.pdf>. 
145 Ibid. at 32.  
146 See e.g. Committee on International Human Rights and Committee on Military Affairs and 
Justice, supra note 32 at 193-94. Except for soldiers in legal and military intelligence units, former 
soldiers I consulted tend to remember the training in ethics and law as cursory and summary, often 
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  The U.S. military overhauled its training programs after U.S. soldiers massacred 
approximately five hundred unarmed civilians in My Lai and then sought to cover up 
the event. Recent reports of military abuses prompt a return to the events leading up 
to My Lai and its consequences for military training.
147 An internal military 
investigation confirmed war crimes only after persistent efforts to investigate by a 
twenty-two-year-old ex-GI named Ronald Ridenhour; the investigation in turn 
triggered the prosecution and conviction of Lieutenant William Calley.
148  
  Calley’s defence attorney argued unsuccessfully that it would be asking too much 
to judge him by the standard of a person “of ordinary sense and understanding” and 
that instead, given Calley’s lower-than-average intelligence (as measured on 
standardized tests), he should be assessed according to the standard of “commonest 
understanding.”
149 The U.S. Court of Military Appeals rejected that argument and 
concluded that if Lieutenant Calley had been given an order to murder infants and 
unarmed civilians, as he claimed, such an order would have been “so palpably illegal 
that whatever conceptional difference there may be between a person of ‘commonest 
understanding’ and a person of ‘common understanding’” would be irrelevant.
150 
  The courts marshal secured convictions of no one other than Calley, though the 
military did pursue the matter internally. A report by Lieutenant General William 
Peers cited as causes for the massacre the lack of leadership and proper training for 
soldiers and superiors about the law of war. This report and related critiques produced 
new teaching programs aimed at preventing and reporting violations.
151 Initially, the 
training programs emphasized that each soldier must learn to question orders.
152 
 
147 See Graham Rayman, “2 Wartime Incidents, 1 Lesson: A Vietnam Massacre Recalled in the 
Light of Recent Haditha Killings Set a Tone for Military’s Response, Some Say” Newsday (18 June 
2006) A24. Recent events have also spurred renewed interest in the Vietnam era and unearthed 
declassified evidence revealing 320 substantiated claims of war crimes and atrocities, not including 
the My Lai massacre. See Nick Turse & Deborah Nelson, “Vietnam Horrors: Darker Yet” Los Angeles 
Times (6 August 2006) A1. 
148 See Douglas O. Linder, My Lai: An Account, online: Famous Trials, University of Missouri-
Kansas City School of Law <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/mylai.htm>. 
149 United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 at 27 (U.S.C.M.A. 1973) [emphasis added]. 
150 Ibid. at 29. 
151 See U.S., Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program (DoD Directive 5100.77) (5 
November 1974). This directive was reissued as U.S., Department of Defense, DoD Law of War 
Program (DoD Directive 5100.77) (10 July 1979), then as U.S., Department of Defense, DoD Law of 
War Program (DoD Directive 5100.77) (9 December 1998), and subsequently as U.S., Department of 
Defense, DoD Law of War Program (DoD Directive 2311.01E) (9 May 2006), online: Washington 
Headquarters Services <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf>.  
152 Some thought the initial reforms reflected an overreaction. Initially, the army used a training film 
entitled The Geneva Conventions and the Soldier (U.S., Department of Army, Training Film 21-4228 
(1972)). Referring to the film, W. Hays Parks, a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps (“JAG 
Corps”) at the time, wrote, “It was a well-produced movie, with professional actors, but it was a 
bureaucratic overreaction to the My Lai massacre that had every soldier questioning every order 
issued by his superior—in addition to portraying superiors in a less-than-flattering light. Needless to 
say, the movie enjoyed a very short run as one commander after another ordered it removed from his 
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Participants telling their own stories warned of peer pressure.
153 Subsequently, 
training programs teach about My Lai but tend to emphasize the importance of 
leadership and respect for law,
154 yet the conditions giving rise to the My Lai incident 
persist. Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster of the British Army, the second most senior 
officer responsible for training Iraqi forces, has criticized the U.S. military for 
“institutional racism, moral righteousness, misplaced optimism, of being ill suited to 
engage in counter-insurgency operations,”
155 and a “stiflingly hierarchical outlook”;
156 
his critiques portray a military largely the same as at the time of the My Lai atrocity.  
  Citing My Lai, U.S. military leaders act more promptly to investigate and 
prosecute at least the abuses that come to public attention.
157 Nonetheless, many 
commentators have suggested that the military seems to have inadequately instructed 
its members in the laws of war and in each individual’s personal responsibility for 
complying with them.
158 Calley tends to be remembered more than helicopter pilot 
Hugh Thompson, who witnessed the slaughter and struggled to halt it and to save 
civilians’ lives.
159 Military training programs face substantive and pedagogical 
                                                                                                                                       
base—justifiably, in my opinion” (“A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes” (1995) 149 Mil. 
L. Rev. 73 at 79). 
153 See Paula Bock, “The Choices Made: Lessons from My Lai on Drawing the Line” The Seattle 
Times  Pacific Northwest Sunday Magazine (10 March 2002), online: The Seattle Times <http:// 
seattletimes.nwsource.com/pacificnw/2002/0310/cover.html> (reporting reflections of Lawrence 
Colburn, the helicopter gunner). 
154 “Why Haditha Matters” The Nation (19 June 2006) 4 (“A generation of future US military 
officers were taught the details of the My Lai massacre as a particular lesson: What makes war crimes 
is criminal leadership”). See also Geoffrey S. Corn, “Haditha and My Lai: Lessons from the Law of 
War”, in which Corn, Professor at South Texas College of Law in Houston and a retired Lieutenant 
Colonel from the Army JAG Corps, emphasizes that lessons from My Lai include the importance of 
leadership and respect for the laws and logic of war (Jurist (2 June 2006), online: University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/06/haditha-and-my-lai-lessons-from-
law-of.php>). 
155 Richard Norton-Taylor, “My Lai’s Untaught Lessons” Guardian Unlimited (2 June 2006), 
online: Guardian Unlimited <http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/richard_nortontaylor/2006/06/ 
the_untaught_lessons_of_my_lai.html> (paraphrasing Aylwin-Foster, infra note 156 at 3, 6, 7). 
156 Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations” (2005) 85:6 
Military Review 2 at 5. 
157 See Rayman, supra note 147 (quoting William Eckhardt, prosecutor of Lt. Calley).  
158 See Robert S. Rivkin, “A Duty to Disobey: The Forgotten Lessons of My Lai” La Prensa San 
Diego (2 May 2004), online: La Prensa San Diego <http://www.laprensa-sandiego.org/archieve/ 
may21-04/disobey.htm>. 
159 For Thompson’s own accounts, see Douglas O. Linder, “The Heroes of My Lai”, online: Famous 
Trials, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/mylai/Myl_hero.html>; Cold War Chat: Hugh Thompson, U.S. Army Helicopter Pilot 
at My Lai (CNN television broadcast, 6 December 1998), online: CNN.com <http://edition.cnn.com/ 
SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/thompson/> (Thompson recalling receiving hostile treatment from 
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difficulties in addressing precisely how a soldier should reconcile the duty to obey 
orders with the potential defence of illegal orders to justify disobedience.
160  
  For the instruction to be meaningful and effective, it must involve more than one 
hour of lecture. Soldiers need to drill through experiential learning so that they have 
reflexes to reject abusive action just as they have reflexes to shoulder a weapon. 
Some of this can come from immersion in hard case studies. Teaching case studies 
provides an encounter with vivid factual descriptions, helps alert people to issues, and 
helps cultivate the ability to recognize problems in practice. Major Mark Martins of 
the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the U.S. Army shows in detail that soldiers 
cannot remember or use all the relevant abstract rules of war and instead need 
schemas, or organized structures of patterned knowledge, repetitive practice, and 
ongoing learning grounded in real stressful situations and real mistakes that real 
soldiers have made.
161 In tense situations of combat or anticipated violence, soldiers 
will rightly fall back on repetitive training for particular operations, and such training 
can include exposure to paradigmatic examples of orders that are manifestly illegal 
and orders that are on the borderline but can be questioned. To be implemented by 
soldiers, the laws of war and ethical limits must be drilled to the same degree that 
training cultivates a sense of membership in a team, attachment to the virtues of 
loyalty and honour, integration of physical, cognitive, and emotional learning, and 
familiarity with one’s weapon. 
  Repeated exposure to vivid examples and involvement in role-playing exercises 
can structure effective drills that have lasting effects. In three informal focus 
groups,
162 veterans from the Israel Defense Force each recalled learning about the 
“Black Flag” incident, even though most did not remember learning the laws of 
war.
163 The Black Flag incident at Kfar Kassem occurred at the onset of the 1956 
 
160 When Hugh Thompson appeared in a training program held at the controversial School of the 
Americas (preparing military action in South America), he received a standing ovation, and yet “the 
ensuing discussion never clarified how soldiers faced with commanders like Calley, Medina, and 
Brooks could deal effectively with illegal orders; indeed, if one soldier had been moved to self-
mutilation to avoid complicity, a direct refusal to obey orders was probably out of the question and 
perhaps even life threatening” (Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and 
Political Violence in the Americas (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004) at 147-48).  
161 Maj. Mark S. Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not 
Lawyering” (1994) 143 Mil. L. Rev. 1 at 24, 71-76, 84-85. 
162 In spring 2006, I conducted two sessions with individuals enrolled as graduate students and their 
spouses who had served in the IDF, and I met with the Wexner Israel Fellows, a group of Israelis 
including current members of the military and government. See “Wexners Pledge Additional 6.3 
Million to Center” Harvard University Gazette (1 June 2006), online: Center for Public Leadership, 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
leadership/warren/wexner_gazette.pdf> (“Since 1989, this initiative has brought up to 10 Israeli 
governmental officials to the Kennedy School each year for a one-year master’s degree”). 
163  The following discussion reflects collaboration with and suggestions from Amos Guiora, 
professor and director of the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve 
 




164 Israeli authorities imposed a curfew to run from 5 p.m. to 6 a.m. 
on Arab villages in Israel near the Jordanian border. At 3:30 p.m. a border patrol unit 
was assigned the task of enforcing the curfew, which was set to begin before villagers 
who were in the fields tilling the land were notified. During the preparatory briefing, 
a member of the force asked what would happen to those returning from the fields 
after the curfew was in effect. The commanding officer replied briefly, “God have 
mercy upon them.” Subordinate officers translated this comment into a directive to 
shoot anyone returning after the curfew. As a result, soldiers killed forty-seven men, 
women, and children returning from the fields. In subsequent trials arising from the 
incident, the Israeli courts concluded that an order to shoot curfew violators was 
blatantly unlawful, and those who followed such an order were court-martialed and 
given long sentences, although none ultimately served more than three and one-half 
years.
165  
  Even long after training and long after military service, veterans of the IDF 
remember the Black Flag incident. In fact, its history is well known throughout the 
country, where it is taught to children in civics classes. Indeed, several Israelis have 
told me that they think basic training is too late a moment to teach soldiers how to 
prevent atrocities. The instruction must start in childhood. Because universal military 
service is a feature of Israeli society, their schools and their youth groups do teach 
about this subject to teens and even younger children. But interestingly, because 
theirs is not a volunteer but a mandatory-service military, the commanders have to 
win the confidence and respect of the soldiers especially around issues of ethics. The 
civilian population is in touch with, and participates in, discussions about acceptable 
conduct. And because their Supreme Court has provided repeated and high-profile 
rulings about what is and what is not acceptable conduct by the military,
166 there may 
                                                                                                                                       
School of Law, and Lt. Col. (retired), Israel Defense Force. See Interview of Amos Guiora by Martha 
Minow (March 2006) on file with author. 
164 The phrase “black flag” was used vividly in a court opinion discussing manifestly illegal orders:  
     The distinguishing mark of a ‘manifestly unlawful order’ should fly like a black 
flag ... Not formal unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, nor unlawfulness discernible 
only by the eyes of legal experts, is important here, but ... unlawfulness piercing the eye 
and revolting the heart, be the eye not blind nor the heart stony and corrupt—that is the 
measure of ‘manifest unlawfulness’ required to release a soldier from the duty of 
obedience (Chief Military Prosecutor v. Melinki (1958), 13 Pesakim Mehoziim 90, 
cited in Israel (A.G.) v. Adolf Eichmann (1961), 36 I.L.R. 18 at 256 (Israel, District 
Court of Jerusalem)).  
165 See “Kfar Kassem 1956”, online: Palestine Facts <http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1948to 
1967_kfarkassem_1956.php>; Leora Bilsky, Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004) at 169-70, 310-24; Shira Robinson, “Local Struggle, 
National Struggle: Palestinian Responses to the Kafr Qasim Massacre and Its Aftermath, 1956-66” 
(2003) 35 International Journal of Middle East Studies 393. These sources show that there is some 
disagreement as to the exact number of civilians killed. 
166 See e.g. Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 2005 HCJ 769/02 (Isr.); Public 
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be a basis for the report by some military veterans that they operated with a constant 
sense that higher authorities are looking over their shoulders.
167 
  The IDF has not solved the dilemma of obedience to superior orders, nor is it 
blameless when it comes to human rights standards. But the strong impact of the 
Black Flag case suggests that vivid scenarios can have an enduring hold. That said, 
given the light sanctions actually enforced in the incident itself, it is frankly not so 
clear what lessons soldiers actually learn.
168 Soldiers should learn from the incident 
that they should never assume that an ambiguous order means that they should kill 
civilians or engage in any other conduct that on its face looks illegal. They should 
know that in such an instance, they can question superiors without being viewed as 
insubordinate, and they should know that court martial or other sanctions follow from 
blindly following orders that are clearly illegal.    
  Pushing in the opposite direction is the emphasis some place on training soldiers 
to follow directions precisely to ensure that they do not give in to their own impulses 
to violate the laws of war. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Gawkins of the U.S. Army 
described to me an incident in which his convoy entered an area in Iraq where 
intelligence had alerted them to likely violence from insurgent forces.
169 Indeed, the 
caravan was hit by some kind of exploding material from the side of the road, 
wounding several individuals, including Gawkins, and shattering the windshield of 
his armoured vehicle. Gawkins told me that as he tended to his own wounds, he saw 
one of the soldiers in his car train his weapon on a man standing at the side of the 
road. The man appeared to be a shepherd; he stood with a young boy and several 
sheep, and he was talking into a cellphone. The soldier was ready to shoot, but his 
commanding officer told him to put down the weapon while keeping an eye on the 
man, and the soldier complied. Gawkins indicated it was a reasonable guess that the 
man was involved in triggering the explosion, but he also could have been simply an 
innocent civilian. When I asked why the soldier so readily put down the weapon, 
Gawkins explained that this was the result of rigorous training that had prepared him 
to follow commands under pressure. When I pressed further, Gawkins also explained 
that the training in his unit included rules against using dehumanizing or degrading 
names for the Iraqis or for Muslims, and he suspected that this further contributed to 
the soldier’s ability to hear and accept the officer’s direction to lower his weapon.  
  Here, then, is the dilemma that reliance on training presents in dealing with 
superior orders and the dangers of military atrocities. Swift obedience to orders may 
be crucial to avoid atrocities just as questioning and refusal to conform may at other 
times be important. It is not clear whether the primary educational goal should be to 
drill answers or instill a questioning stance. Either is problematic in this context. 
Gawkins suggested that the tension can be mitigated to some extent in the process by 
 
167 It remains uncertain whether this will change with the end of Chief Justice Aharon Barak’s 
service on the Israel Supreme Court. 
168 I would like to thank Professor Pnina Lahav for emphasizing this point. 
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which the unit relays orders. The superior gives the order and the junior officer who 
receives it should repeat it and ask any clarifying questions about it. But in Gawkins’ 
account, that routine does not include questioning the substance of the order.
170  
  The content of the training is ultimately less important than the importance given 
to it by daily command structure and military culture. Training that emphasizes the 
legal and moral duties attaching to each soldier, including adherence to the laws of 
war, may be helpful, but only if the officers reinforce that message and subscribe to 
the same legal and moral duties. Then, it will not be the training alone that matters, 
but also the message throughout the organization, and especially from the top, about 
the significance of those duties and about the equal priority of legal and ethical 
training as compared to training in weapons and intelligence. Competence in 
handling weapons does not imply moral competence: “Officers and soldiers not 
morally competent are not militarily competent.”
171 Absent inspiration to pursue 
honour and allegiance to the standards of morality exemplified by the leaders, 
soldiers may bring disgrace.  
  Demonstrating and communicating the interdependencies of moral and legal 
duties with all other dimensions of military preparedness would be crucial for gaining 
requisite credibility with soldiers and officers alike. Amos Guiora, who ran training 
programs in the IDF before setting up the Institute for Global Security at Case 
Western Reserve Law School, found it possible to win the support of officers for 
rigorous ethics instruction precisely by connecting it with combat preparation:  
Commanders buy into training about moral and legal duties because they 
believe that operating well in armed conflict calls for training their soldiers on 
issues of morality and that is just as important as issues of intelligence, and 
weapons. Discipline in the field around these issues is crucial because if the 
soldiers are not prepared on this, it is just as bad as if they are not prepared in 
intelligence, how to shoot a gun, [or] medics. An ill-disciplined unit lacking 
compliance with the codes will perform less well operationally, make mistakes 
in the field, and often be a failure. So teaching this is just as important as 
teaching operations, intelligence, and weapons.
172  
Training in the legality of tactics has to be early and constant. It is too late to think it 
through when the crisis happens. 
 
170 Gawkins also indicated that the U.S. Army has used surveys to assess the atmosphere of units 
especially around issues of ethnic and racial harassment. Soldiers are asked about their comfort level 
in the unit and this contributes to a grade given to the commanding officer. In this context, another 
atmospheric feature that could be assessed is how comfortable soldiers feel to raise questions—but 
even that question, and the value behind it, would require a notable change in how to value questions 
in comparison with obedience. See Interview, ibid.  
171 Toner, supra note 7 at 43. 
172 Interview of Amos Guiora by Martha Minow, supra note 163. See also Amos Guiora & Martha 
Minow, “National Objectives in the Hands of Junior Leaders: IDF Experiences in Combating Terror” 
in James J.F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism in the 21
st Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security 
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  Selecting who teaches the material on law and ethics may make the difference 
between effective and ineffective instruction. Lawyers who are remote from the 
platoon do not make as effective instructors as officers who have earned the respect 
of their troops. Especially if the instructors are viewed as outsiders, naive, or remote 
from the real demands of the military, their message will not reach the solders.
173  
C.  Aligning Commands with Law and Morality  
  If we are serious about wanting to enable individual soldiers to resist peer 
pressure, the burden cannot be placed solely on the individuals. The concern must 
also infuse soldiers’ training and incentives, the command structure, and the stance 
taken by superior officers if atrocities during wartime are ever to be prevented.
174 The 
authorization for massacres, abuse, and dehumanization of those victimized may 
come from military and civilian leaders, but these forces cannot produce atrocities 
unless front-line soldiers and their immediate commanders commit them instead of 
asserting their own moral judgments and actions. High authorities tend to blame 
soldiers participating in abuses as errant “bad apples”, but bad orders, environment, 
culture, command and organizational structure, and relationships between operations 
and legal analysis are also implicated. Work addressing the individual’s knowledge 
and incentives, the organization’s structure and practices, and the processes of 
accountability must proceed in a coordinated fashion if atrocities are to be prevented 
or reduced.  
1.  Try to Eliminate Bad Orders  
  The most direct way to avoid the problem of soldiers following illegal orders is to 
ensure that they do not receive any. Recent developments expose at least two 
difficulties with this direct solution. First, debate within the executive branch and 
responses by the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress over the lawfulness of detention 
practices has strained the ability of anyone in the military to know for certain the line 
of illegality. Following 9/11, memoranda written for the U.S. president contended that 
offshore detainees lacked protections under domestic and international law and 
lacked access to U.S. courts to challenge their detention or conditions.
175 Another 
memorandum construed the U.S. ban against torture to encompass only suffering 
“equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe 
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body 
function will likely result.”
176 On these bases, Guantánamo interrogators received 
 
173 See Interview, ibid.  
174 Entirely understandable is the reaction of the guard at Abu Ghraib who saw conduct he thought 
immoral but who assumed that someone would have said something if relevant guidelines were not 
being followed. See supra note 40. 
175 See Yoo Memorandum, supra note 27. 
176 Bybee Memorandum, supra note 70 at 13. Accord U.S., Department of Defense, Working Group 
Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, 
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authorization to use certain “counter-resistance techniques”, including sensory 
deprivation, hooding, playing on phobias, and stress positions,
177 and some of these 
techniques migrated to the prison at Abu Ghraib. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme 
Court set some limits on the detention policies, opening access to judicial review,
178 
and Congress enacted a law re-establishing the U.S. commitment to refrain from cruel 
or inhumane treatment of detainees, but also passed a law drastically limiting access 
to judicial review.
179 Against this high-level dispute, sorting out good and bad orders 
would be nearly impossible for ordinary soldiers, especially considering that military 
lawyers advised against the direction pursued by the White House.
180 
  A second difficulty in preventing bad orders is the shift from explicit to implicit 
or vague orders. Such a shift is a likely effect of learning legal rules. Certainly no 
commanding officer would give as the order, “Commit genocide.” What precisely 
should a solider know to be unlawful? When does a less explicit order amount to a 
command to commit genocide? A soldier would have to know genocide’s legal 
elements, including the element of intention, in order to recognize that particular 
directives adding up over time might constitute genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
other violations of legal norms. When, and how, should a soldier think for himself or 
herself about the ultimate or aggregate meaning of vague orders? Officers breaching 
the borders of legality in their orders will most likely not give a directive that 
explicitly states, “Deprive this person of treatment required under international law,” 
or “Use torture on this detainee.” The commander may well instead say, “Keep this 
detainee quiet,” or “Make this detainee aware we mean business,” or “Make sure 
there is no local person aware of our approach toward the village.” The soldier may 
not even be aware that a potentially illegal order is at hand: it may be the soldier’s 
interpretation of a vague or euphemistic order that leads to crossing the line to 
illegality.
181 Here, as elsewhere, perceiving a moral problem can be as crucial as 
                                                                                                                                       
Policy, and Operational Considerations (4 April 2003), online: The National Security Archive 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf>.  
177 Haynes Memorandum, supra note 30. 
178 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 33; Rasul, supra note 28; Hamdi, supra note 28. 
179 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,  supra  note 32, §1403. The 
skirmish over cruel or inhumane treatment standards continued with the presidential signing statement 
announcing the Executive’s intention to interpret the law. See Signing Statement, supra note 32. 
Congress also enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which forecloses access to court for 
detainees named as enemy combatants or awaiting determination regarding enemy combatant status 
(Pub. L. No. 109-366, §7, 120 Stat. 2600 at 2636).  
180 See note 36 and accompanying text (discussing Albert Mora). 
181 No written orders were issued before the My Lai massacre—and the prevalence of vague orders 
containing ambiguities transmitted down the chain of subordinates is well known. See Kelman & 
Hamilton, supra note 94 at 2. As military operations develop in urban settings, in occupations, and in 
stealth operations, actual “orders” are less common than general purpose directions, and discretion in 
selecting tactics is exercised by platoon leaders or their equivalents close to the ground. See Part 
IV.C.3, below. 2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  49 
 
 
working up the courage to act upon it.
182 But to achieve the goal of preventing 
violations of international and domestic norms, officers must neither give illegal 
orders nor give the impression that they condone or permit abusive conduct. 
   Consider the ways that commanding officers can convey approval or expectation 
of abusive or atrocious behaviour: The officer may simply say, “Get the detainees 
ready for interrogation,” but mean, “Abuse and humiliate them.” Or he may say, 
“Clear the area” but convey, instead, “Kill the people who are there.”
183 Conveyed as 
a hint, such comments may be interpreted as a powerful directive, especially when 
communicated by an officer to a young soldier who has been primed to follow his or 
her superior. 
 2.  Promote a Constraining and Aspirational Culture  
  The absence of explicit orders may occasionally result from clever officers 
seeking to avoid consequences, doubt, or even dispute among officers about what the 
law permits. Yet it is more likely to reflect either failure to establish a culture of 
honour and morality, or changes in military methods that include reducing strict 
hierarchy and decentralizing decision making. For vague orders to be construed as 
direct orders to commit abuses, members of the unit must not believe that their 
superiors or their peers care about violations of law and morality. The pressures and 
temptations of armed conflict make such violations always a risk, so failure to 
establish a constraining—and aspirational—culture increases the likelihood of 
atrocities. Hence, blind obedience to noxious commands may be less dangerous than 
ordinary soldiers “filling in the blanks” with poor judgment or anxiety-triggered 
viciousness. It is not entirely fair to characterize events at My Lai or Abu Ghraib as 
the results of “bad apples” if the environment and military organization fail to provide 
the cultural norms and direct supervision needed to prevent violations.  
3.  Address Command and Organizational Structure  
  Current military practice, when compared with nineteenth- and mid-twentieth-
century norms, operates less through strict hierarchy and more through decentralized 
and team-based decision making. Soldiers may proceed without explicit hierarchical 
orders when they work in teams responding to an immediate problem. In fact, modern 
military procedures tend to replace strict hierarchical command with independent, 
small groups that have better knowledge of local situations than do distant 
commanders, and that control complex weapons, communications, and other 
 
182 See Lawrence A. Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994) at 41-45, 124-43. 




184 Current analysis prefers military organizations that allow for 
maximum flexibility so that each unit in the hierarchy can arrange its tactical 
operations to meet the overarching goal identified in the stated mission.
185 Platoon 
leaders and their teams receive general objectives, integrated with rules of 
engagement that incorporate domestic and international law.
186 Soldiers in turn are 
trained and rehearse tasks in accordance with their specific rules of engagement.
187 
  It may seem logical that an increasingly flat organizational structure eases the 
dilemma of the superior orders defence. With greater collaboration and less rigidly 
hierarchical discipline, the problem of blind obedience to illegal orders would appear 
to diminish. But in many ways, this development exacerbates the dilemma and the 
risk of abusive conduct. True, a soldier may be confronted less often with the choice 
to either obey a direct and explicit order to commit a war crime or else face personal 
jeopardy from a commanding officer. But general directions to a team demand 
individual discretion. As a participant in an urban operation in an occupied territory, 
under a general direction to “clear the area” or “secure the street”, each soldier risks 
becoming involved in harming civilians in violation of the laws of war. As a member 
of the team in charge of detainees, each soldier is in danger of both falling under the 
sway of peer pressure and of acting without sensible guidance. Therefore, 
contemporary command structure requires that each soldier be taught to maintain 
attention to the laws of war while operating amid decentralized command and tacit 
orders—and while acting under stressful and emergency conditions.  
4. Integrate  Legal  Analysis into Platoon Command 
  Still, it cannot be left to the individual soldier to know the laws of war and apply 
them to particular operations. Instead, legal analysis must be incorporated at each 
stage of command and therefore with the support and participation of the command 
structure. This may seem unrealistic to outsiders, but in fact (and this is one lasting 
consequence of the My Lai massacre), lawyers have become much more directly 
involved in planning U.S. military operations. Lawyers review and often draft the 
 
184 See Keijzer, supra note 50 at 43-48; Osiel, ibid. at 214-21, 233-34; Martins, supra note 161; 
Hermann Jung, “Preparing for Asymmetry—Joint Visions 2010 and 2020—An Organizational 
Learning Perspective” in Micewski & Annen, supra note 135, 179 at 190-92.  
185 See U.S., Department of the Navy, Marine Corps, Warfighting (MCDP 1) at 77-78 (1997), 
online: Defense Technical Information Center <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ 
mcdp1.pdf>.  
186 See U.S., Department of the Army, Legal Support to Operations (FM 27-100), ss. 8.2, 8.3 (1 
March 2000), online: United States Army Training Support Center <https://atiam.train.army.mil:443/ 
soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/9422-1/fm/27-100/fm27-100.pdf> [Legal Support to Operations] 
(field manual on the mission and methods of the judge advocates and supporting legal personnel 
detailing how rules of engagement implement strategic policy decisions, serving operational or 
tactical military goals while bringing U.S. forces in compliance with domestic and international law). 




188 They shape and participate in training programs whose 
credibility is enhanced precisely due to their involvement. Discussion about the 
legality or justifiability of conduct is now threaded throughout U.S. military training 
and the planning of operations.
189 Integrated attention to the legality of orders is a 
central part of the training program used by the U.S. Marine Corps, which embraces 
the goal of ensuring compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
190 
Providing access to legal advisors during planning and execution of operations is now 
a priority in many parts of the U.S. military.
191 Training materials increasingly look 
like law school materials, relying on detailed scenarios to hone the situational 
judgment of soldiers.
192  
  Through these means, the law can become a tool for analysis and critical thinking 
rather than a set of commandments. As one commentator explains, the lawyer serving 
as a judge advocate is supposed to give detailed advice and “ensure that if the 
commander breaks the law, he is doing it intentionally.”
193 Thoughtful figures within 
and outside the military argue for integrating law into the fabric of daily operations. 
Some identify how “lawfare”, as a tool for winning and keeping hearts and minds, 
can deeply affect the perception of the military by its own nation and by its 
enemies.
194 The White House circumvented the process of involving military lawyers 
in the planning and assessments of interrogation and detention practices between 9/11 
and when the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo were exposed.
195 Unlike White 
House and Department of Justice lawyers, who in general lacked experience with the 
 
188 See Maj. Derek I. Grimes, Maj. John Rawcliffe & Capt. Jeannine Smith, eds., Operational Law 
Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.: International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center School, 2006) at 93ff., online: Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/oplaw_hdbk.pdf>; Stephen A. Myrow, “Waging War on 
the Advice of Counsel: The Role of Operational Law in the Gulf War” (1996-1997) 7 U.S. Air Force 
Academy Journal of Legal Studies 131 at 136, 140-42.  
189 See Myrow, ibid. at 141. 
190 U.S., Department of Defense, Marine Corps Order 3300.4, s. 1(a)(1) (20 October 2003), online: 
U.S. Marine Corps <http://www.usmc.mil/directiv.nsf/mco?openview&count=5000&start=1>.  
191 See e.g. ibid., s. 1(a)(3); Myrow, supra note 188. 
192 See Martins, supra note 161; Myrow, ibid. at 137-39, 142. See generally Grimes, Rawcliffe & 
Smith, supra note 188 at 3.  
193 Myrow, ibid. at 144. See also Legal Support to Operations, supra note 186. 
194 See Council on Foreign Relations, “Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries” (summary of meeting 
held as part of Roundtable on National Security: Military Strategy & Options, 18 March 2003), 
online: Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5772> (“Lawfare is a 
strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military 
objectives”); Jeremy Rabkin, “‘Lawfare’” The Wall Street Journal (17 July 2004) A14 (arguing that 
law can be used cynically to gain a military advantage, but a military’s failure to comport with law 
gives a lever to opponents both practically, as when a court deals a blow to the military’s tactics, and 
in the court of public opinion). For cautions against counting on legal vocabulary and rules to 
strengthen personal responsibility for soldiers and leaders, see David Kennedy, Of War and Law 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 12, 125-28, 142, 163-70. 
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laws of war and knowledge of the practices of the military, the military Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps lawyers who consulted on the issues integrated the spirit of 
international law into their recommendations for treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban 
suspects.
196 
   Weaving law into strategy and tactics, rules of engagement, and training is an 
example of the organizational approach that involves the ordinary soldier but does not 
place the burden of lawfulness on his or her solitary shoulders. Especially where the 
scope of legality is contested or ambiguous, it is unreasonable, indeed far-fetched, to 
expect every soldier to monitor and take full responsibility for understanding debates 
over the legality of orders as part of his or her daily job. The rank-and-file soldier 
does not usually have access to lawyers for opinions and advice.
197 More than the 
front-line soldier, officers must carry responsibility for assessing the legality of 
directives, and yet generals and other high-ranking officers are generally too removed 
from the action to make the judgments that integrate law into what the soldier must 
actually do. Hence, the platoon leader, closest to the ordinary solider, should carry 
special responsibility for knowing and applying the law of war in assessing 
commands from above and framing directives for action. The army field manual that 
serves as foundational text of army leadership for every officer includes these 
provisions that are especially well-suited to the platoon leader:  
  4-74. Under normal circumstances, a leader executes a superior leader’s 
decision with energy and enthusiasm. The only exception would be illegal 
orders, which a leader has a duty to disobey. If a Soldier perceives that an order 
is illegal, that Soldier should be sure the details of the order and its original 
intent are fully understood. The Soldier should seek immediate clarification 
from the person who gave it before proceeding. 
  4-75. If the question is more complex, seek legal counsel. If it requires an 
immediate decision, as may happen in the heat of combat, make the best 
judgment possible based on the Army Values, personal experience, critical 
thinking, and previous study and reflection. There is a risk when a leader 
disobeys what may be an illegal order, and it may be the most difficult decision 
that Soldier ever makes. Nonetheless, that is what competent, confident, and 
ethical leaders should do.
198 
 
196 See ibid. at 740-41. 
197  With modern technology such as cellphones and text messaging, this would not be an 
impossibility; determining who has access to military lawyers is now a military choice that itself 
should be relevant in assigning responsibility for compliance with the law. 
198 U.S., Department of the Army, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile (FM 6-22) 
(October 2006), online: United States Army Training Support Center <https://atiam.train.army. 
mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23230-1/FM/6-22/FM6_22.pdf>. See also David L. Perry, 
“How Ethics is Taught in the U.S. Army War College” in Micewski & Annen, supra note 135, 152 at 
157; Richard A. Gabriel, “Legitimate Avenues of Military Protest in a Democratic Society” in Military 
Ethics: Reflections on Principles—the Profession of Arms, Military Leadership, Ethical Practices, 
War and Morality, Educating the Citizen-Soldier (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1987) 101 at 104-10 (morally permissible avenues for military officers to protest orders include 
 
 2007] M. MINOW –THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENCE  53 
 
 
With increasingly more discretion and tactical decision making at the platoon level, 
the platoon leader should be the focus of training and responsibility for ensuring the 
lawfulness of orders,
199 including both orders coming from above and the platoon 
leader’s own orders. Indeed, in some circumstances, perhaps the platoon leader 
should be given the specific job of playing devil’s advocate in order to reduce the 
groupthink and conformity surrounding a superior officer.
200 
5.  Allocate Resources for Translation and Consultation  
  Sensible allocation of resources to prevent abuses is the kind of detail that, once 
again, the lowest-level soldier cannot accomplish. A member of the IDF Judge 
Advocate Corps described the instance of an eighteen-year-old guard serving at a 
checkpoint between two parts of the territories (not between Israel proper and a 
territory).
201 One order from high authority directed that no person could pass through 
the checkpoint with food or drink without taking a bite or a sip in front of the guard in 
order to demonstrate that the substance was not a biological weapon or other danger. 
A Palestinian woman carrying a container filled with a clear liquid came to the 
checkpoint. The guard directed her to take a sip. The guard did not speak Arabic and 
apparently the Palestinian did not understand Hebrew. The guard, frustrated, repeated 
the direction and finally pointed her gun at the Palestinian, and motioned that she 
should drink the liquid, which she did. The guard passed her through the checkpoint 
only to hear her collapse in convulsions shortly thereafter. As it turned out, the liquid 
was machine oil that the woman was bringing to her husband so he could clean his 
engine.  
   Here the order under which the guard operated was not itself illegal, and certainly 
not manifestly so, but her implementation of it was thoughtless and inflicted genuine 
harm. She faced disciplinary sanctions. The individual soldier should indeed be 
induced to think more carefully than this soldier did. But so should resources be 
arranged so that a soldier in such a situation would have someone to turn to for 
translation given the predictable communication problem at a checkpoint, or at least 
someone to consult about what to do in the face of such a problem. This mess would 
                                                                                                                                       
resignation, request for relief in protest, appeals to a higher command, and refusal, with potential 
defence at a court martial). By addressing officers rather than rank-and-file soldiers, such guidelines 
indicate how the question of disobedience affects the duties and capacities of officers differently than 
other soldiers. 
199 See Guiora & Minow, supra note 172. The omission of the topic of serious ethic abuses in 
training materials for junior officers is striking, given their pivotal role in implementing commands 
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not be avoided if the soldier was perfectly trained to resist a manifestly illegal 
command nor if she had memorized the Geneva Conventions. Teaching alone will be 
insufficient; there must be related changes in the organization, management, rewards, 
and punishments of military operations in order to guard against abuses and atrocities. 
The integration of law into day-to-day operations requires recasting law from a set of 
rules legislating norms to ongoing practices of reflection and interrogation of action 
and operations. 
Conclusion 
  When should a soldier be held responsible for following orders? Pursuing this 
question illustrates how complicated the very statement of an important rule can be, 
how instruction in a rule may not sufficiently affect conduct, especially conduct in 
stressful situations, and how ethical thinking requires individual courage but also 
reinforcement through a larger strategy to design and maintain the organization, 
management, rewards, and punishments of day-to-day operations. If only to express 
the symbolic importance of individual accountability central to democratic ideals, the 
law should permit no defence to charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
violations of the law of war on the basis of following orders. Yet social science 
research predicts that soldiers will in fact follow orders, whether legal or illegal, and 
that soldiers will conform to expectations of superiors and peers. Soldiers will not 
only be unlikely to resist a commander or peer group authorizing or engaging in 
atrocities but will also be prompted to join in with abusive behaviour started by peers 
or prodded by superiors. Reducing the risk of military atrocity requires the direct 
engagement of the entire military, civilian authorities, and citizens in designing the 
organization, the norms, and a culture that demand lawful and ethical conduct. 
Otherwise, atrocities will recur—and we will all be responsible. 
      
 
 